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Abstract
Can active Taylor rules (i.e. monetary rules where the nominal interest rate responds more than
proportionally to inﬂation) deliver global equilibrium uniqueness in small open economies? By studying
the local and global dynamics of a standard small open economy we point out the misleading results and
policy advices that one would derive from a standard local analysis. We show that rules that guarantee
a local unique equilibrium may actually lead the economy into liquidty traps, cycles and chaos. More
importantly we ﬁnd that there is an interesting interaction between the relative risk aversion coeﬃcient
and the degree of openness that determines the nature of the global dynamics of the aforementioned
economy. In particular, given the relative risk aversion coeﬃcient, we show that the more open the
economy is, the more likely is that a contemporaneous rule will drive the economy into a liquidity trap.
On the other hand, the more closed the economy is, the more likely is that the same rule will lead to
cycles and chaotic dynamics around the inﬂation target. In contrast for forward-looking rules we ﬁnd
that given the relative risk aversion coeﬃcient, it is more likely that these rules will lead the economy
into cycles and chaos, the higher the degree of openness of the economy is.
Although the perils of Taylor rules are evident, the monetary authority can still play a role by at
least eliminating cyclical equilibria without giving up its local stability properties. This can be achieved
by targeting a high enough inﬂation level and by being “not too aggressive” with respect to this target,
with such relative levels being functions of the “cash dependency” of the economy.
Through a simple calibration exercise, we provide a quantitative evaluation of how feasible and
relevant our analytically derived results are for the design of monetary policy. In this sense the theoretical
results of this paper might provide some warning for small open economies moving to inﬂation targeting
regimes through interest rates feedback rules and Ricardian ﬁscal rules.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
In recent years there has been a revival of theoretical and empirical literature aimed at understanding the
macroeconomic consequences of implementing diverse monetary rules in the small open economy. Some
examples of this literature are the works by Ball (1999), Svensson (2000), Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1998,
2001), Gali and Monacelli (2002), and Kollmann (2002).1
In this literature the study of interest rate rules whose interest rate response coeﬃcient to inﬂation is
greater than one has received particular attention. These rules also known as Taylor rules or active rules,
imply that in response to a one percent in inﬂation, the government raises the nominal interest rate by more
than one percent leading to an increase in the real interest rate.2 To some extent the importance given to
these rules in the small open economy literature is just a consequence of some of the beneﬁts that the closed
economy literature has claimed for these rules. For instance, Leeper (1991), Bernanke and Woodford (1997)
and Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2000) have argued that active interest rate rules guarantee a unique rational
expectations equilibrium whereas rules whose interest rate response coeﬃcient to inﬂa t i o ni sl e s st h a no n e ,
also referred as passive rules, induce aggregate instability in the economy by generating multiple equilibria.
Although this is an important argument that supports the implementation of active interest rate rules in
closed economies, it is not exempt from some drawbacks. In particular Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe
(2001a) have pointed out that this argument relies on a local determinacy of equilibrium analysis, that is,
on small ﬂuctuations around the inﬂation target and depends on how money is introduced in the model
and on the interaction between ﬁscal and monetary policy. In addition Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe
(2001b, 2002) have also noticed that previous analyses of interest rate rules in closed economies have not
taken into account the fact that nominal interest rates are bounded below by zero. Once this zero bound
is considered and a non-linear analysis is pursued, they have shown that active interest rate rules may also
induce aggregate instability in closed economies by generating cycles, chaotic dynamics or liquidity traps
(deﬂationary paths).
Taking into consideration these results of the literature for active interest rate rules in closed economies,
it is possible to argue that its counterpart for open economies has been overlooking two important elements
of the analysis. First, it has disregarded the fact that active rules may also lead to aggregate instability in the
open economy by generating local multiple equilibria under conditions that are not a simple extension of the
conditions in the closed economy literature. In other words this literature has paid little attention to the fact
that depending on some particular features of the open economy, active rules may embark the open economy
on ﬂuctuations that are determined not only by fundamentals but also by self-fulﬁlling expectations. Second,
the observation emphasized by Benhabib et al. for the closed economy literature of active Taylor rules also
applies to the open economy literature. In other words, the studies for open economies have restricted their
analysis to local dynamics and not to global dynamics, and some of the works have not considered the zero
bound on the nominal interest rate.
With respect to the ﬁrst element, Zanna (2003a) and Airaudo and Zanna (2003) have pursued local
equilibrium analyses for interest rate rules in small open economies. They have shown that conditions
under which active interest rate rules induce multiple equilibria in the small open economy depend not only
1See also Ghironi (2002), Ghironi and Rebucci (2001), Devereux and Lane (2003), and Lubik and Schorfheide (2003).
2See Taylor (1993) and Henderson and Mckibbon (1993).
2on the interest rate response coeﬃcient to inﬂation but also on some speciﬁc characteristics of the open
economy that are not present in the closed counterpart. In particular Zanna(2003a) ﬁnds that some of these
characteristics are the degree of openness of the economy and the degree of exchange rate pass-through.3
He argues that more open economies and economies with a higher degree of exchange rate pass-through are
prone to suﬀer of aggregate instability due to the presence of multiple equilibria generated by active interest
rate rules that respond to the CPI-inﬂation. On the other hand, Airaudo and Zanna (2003) have shown
that forward-looking interest rate rules may generate endogenous ﬂuctuations in the small open economy
due to Hopf bifurcations. In their model the bifurcation parameter corresponds to the interest rate response
coeﬃcient to the weighted average of expected future CPI-inﬂation. However they ﬁnd that there exists an
interesting interaction between this coeﬃcient, the weight that the monetary authority puts on expected
future inﬂation in the rule and the degree of openness of the economy. This interaction determines how
likely Hopf bifurcations are in their model.
The second missing element of the analysis of active interest rate rules in open economies is what mo-
tivates the present paper. In fact this paper is one of the ﬁrst attempts of the open economy literature to
understand how interest rate rules may lead to global endogenous ﬂuctuations. We pursue a global and non-
linear equilibrium analysis for a traditional small open economy model with traded and non-traded good,
whose government follows an active Taylor rule with respect to the CPI-inﬂation. We show that the global
equilibrium dynamics of the model induced by this rule varies with the level of some structural parameters
of the economy such as the degree of openness, measured as the share of traded goods, and the relative risk
aversion coeﬃcient. In particular, we ﬁnd that under both contemporaneous and forward looking Taylor
rules the economy might display monotonic deﬂationary paths, cycles and chaotic dynamics around both the
active and the passive steady state. These dynamics are possible, even for rules that under a local analysis
guarantee a unique equilibrium. With respect to the closed economy work of Benhabib et al. (2002) we
obtain a richer set of dynamics. For instance, given the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion, we show that the
more open the economy is, the more likely is that a contemporaneous active rule will drive the economy into
a liquidity trap. On the other hand, the more closed the economy is, the more likely is that the same rule
will lead to cycles and chaotic dynamics around the inﬂation target. In contrast for forward-looking rules we
ﬁnd that given the relative risk aversion coeﬃcient, it is more likely that these rules will lead the economy
into cycles and chaos, the more open the economy is.
Although the perils of Taylor rules are evident, the monetary authority can still play a role by at least
eliminating cyclical equilibria without giving up its local stability properties. This can be achieved by
targeting a high enough inﬂation level and by being “not too aggressive” with respect to this target, with
such relative levels being functions of the “cash dependency” of the economy. In this sense monetary policy
can be used as the only tool to completely eliminate endogenous ﬂuctuations without resorting to speciﬁc
ﬁscal rules. The latter might instead be used to avoid the risk of deﬂationary paths.
In principle more “cash dependent” economies that follow the appropiate contemporaneous rule might
be able to completely eliminate endogenous ﬂuctuations. However this contrasts with less “cash dependent”
economies that follow forward-looking rules in which the appearance of cycles and chaotics dynamics seems
to be pervasive.
3See also Linnemann and Schabert (2002) and De Fiore and Liu (2003) that also discuss the importance of the degree of
openness of the economy in the determinacy of equilibrium analysis.
3Through a simple calibration exercise, we provide a quantitative evaluation of how feasible and relevant
our analytically derived results are for the design of monetary policy. Furthermore we also discuss how
changing the target of inﬂation from the CPI-inﬂation to the non-traded goods inﬂation aﬀects the previous
results.
We believe the results of our paper may be interesting for two reasons. First, as is well known there
exists an unanimous consensus about the beneﬁts of the framework of inﬂation targeting through interest
rate feedback rules. In this sense the theoretical results of this paper might provide some warning about some
possible negative consequences for small open economies moving to this framework. The message that we
want to convey is that some speciﬁcations of the aforementioned rules may generate endogenous ﬂuctuations
and therefore aggregate instability in the economy. This implies that further research in this area is needed.
Second our results point out the importance of considering particular features of the open economy in
the design of the monetary policy. In particular this paper emphasizes the relevant role that the degree
of openness of the economy plays not only in the local equilibrium analysis but also in the global equi-
librium analysis. Clearly the degree of openness of the economy, measured in our model as the share of
traded goods, is a characteristic of an open economy that is not present in previous closed economy models.
More importantly this feature of the open economy varies among economies that follow (or followed) active
contemporaneous or forward-looking interest rate rules as Table 1 shows.4
Table 1:
Country Degree of Openness Type of Rule ρπ Study
Imports/GDP
Germany 0.26 Forward− Looking 1.31 Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1998)
France 0.22 Forward− Looking 1.13 Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1998)
Japan 0.10 Forward− Looking 2.04 Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1998)
United Kingdom 0.28 Contemporaneous 1.84 Lubik and Schorfheide (2003)
Australia 0.19 Contemporaneous 2.10 Lubik and Schorfheide (2003)
Canada 0.31 Contemporaneous 2.24 Lubik and Schorfheide (2003)
New Zealand 0.28 Contemporaneous 2.49 Lubik and Schorfheide (2003)
Costa Rica 0.42 Forward− Looking 1.47 Corbo (2000)
Colombia 0.20 Contemporaneous 1.31 Zanna (2003b)
Chile 0.28 Forward− Looking 1.39 Restrepo (1999)
Note: ρπ is the interest rate response coeﬃcient to the CPI-inﬂation in the rule.
Data from IFS was used to calculate the Imports/GDP share.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a ﬂexible-price model with its
4In this table we measure the degree of openness of the economy as the share of imported goods. We also present some of
the estimates of contemporaneous and forward-looking rules that have been done for some of the economies. We borrow the
estimates from Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1998), Restrepo (1999), Corbo (2000), Lubik and Schorfheide (2003), and Zanna(2003).
The share of imports goods was calculated as the annual average of this share for the respective period of time used for the
aformentioned estimations.
4main assumptions. Section 3 deﬁnes the equilibrium concept we refer to. Section 4 pursues a local and
a global equilibrium analyses for an active contemporaneous interest rate rule. Section 5 does the same
analyses for an active forward looking rule. Section 6 presents a sensitivity analysis for the previous results
under changes of the inﬂation target, the degree of aggressivness of the rule and the importance of money
in our model. Section 7 analyzes the role of cash in providing transaction services and argues that there is
still some role for monetary policy to eliminate cyclical ﬂuctuations without any help from the ﬁscal side.
Section 8 discusses brieﬂy the implications in terms of our previous results of adopting a backward-looking
rule or of targeting the non-traded goods inﬂation in stead of the CPI-inﬂation. Finally Section 9 concludes.
2A F l e x i b l e - P r i c e M o d e l
2.1 The Household-Firm Unit
Consider a small open economy populated by a large number of inﬁnitely lived household-ﬁrm units with
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(1)
where α, β, γ ∈ (0,1), and ψ,σ > 0;E corresponds to the expectation operator, cT
t and cN
t denote the
consumption of traded and non-traded goods in period t respectively, Md
t denotes nominal money balances,
PT
t denotes the price level of the traded good, and hT
t and hN
t are the labor allocated to the production of
the traded good and the non-traded good respectively. Equation (1) implies that the household-ﬁrm unit
derives utility from consuming traded and non-traded goods, from the liquidity services of money and from
not working in either sector.
The representative household-ﬁrm unit only requires labor for the production of traded and non-traded












where 0 <θ T < 1 and 0 <θ N < 1.
Before we continue with the description of the model it is worth pointing out that we have introduced
money in the utility function but we have not imposed any restrictions in terms of the relationship between
real money balances and consumption. In other terms denoting c as the aggregate consumption, c =
(cT
t )α(cN
t )(1−α), we will consider the case in which real money balances and consumption are Edgeworth
substitutes, Ucm < 0 and the case in which they are complements, Ucm > 0. In our model these cases
a r ei nt u r nd e t e r m i n e db yt h ev a l u eo ft h ep a r a m e t e rσ that corresponds to the relative risk aversion
coeﬃcient. Namely if σ>1 (σ<1) then real money balances and consumption are Edgeworth substitutes
(complements).
5In this paper speciﬁcf u n c t i o n a lf o r m sa r ea s s u m e dt ob ea b l et oc o n v e yt h em a i nm e s s a g eo ft h i sp a p e r .
5In addition it is important to observe that recent studies about interest rate rules in closed economies,
such as Benhabib et al. (2001a,b, 2002), have analyzed the consequences in the equilibrium analysis of
introducing money-in-the-production-function (MIPF). As noted by Feenstra (1986) models of money in the
production function are isomorphic to a money-in-the-utility-function (MIUF) endowment economy with
Ucm < 0. Therefore we expect that our results for the MIUF in which real money balances and consumption
are Edgeworth substitutes, Ucm < 0, would be similar to those derived on a MIPF set-up.
We assume that the law of one price holds for the traded good and to simplify the analysis we normalize
the foreign price of the traded good to one. Therefore, the domestic currency price of traded goods (PT
t )i s
equal to the nominal exchange rate (Et). That is PT
t = Et. This simpliﬁcation in tandem with (1) can be







αα(1 − α)1−α (3)
Using equation (3) and deﬁning the gross nominal devaluation rate as
 t = Et/Et−1 (4)
it is straightforward to derive the gross CPI-inﬂation rate, πt, as a weighted average of the gross nominal
depreciation rate,  t, and the gross inﬂation of the non-traded goods, πN
t = PN
t /PN
t−1;t h a ti s
πt =  α
t (πN
t )(1−α) (5)
where the weights are related to the share of traded goods α. This share can be seen as a measure of openness
of the economy. As α goes to zero (α → 0) we regard the economy as a closed economy; whereas if α tends
to one (α → 1) then we consider the economy as a very open one.
We deﬁne the real exchange rate (et) as the ratio between the price of traded goods and the aggregate
price of non-traded goods.
et = Et/PN
t (6)








In order to avoid the “unit-root” problem in the local determinacy of equilibrium analysis we assume
complete ﬁnancial markets.6 That is household-ﬁrm units have access to a complete set of contingent claims
traded internationally. In each period t ≥ 0 the agents can purchase two types of ﬁnancial assets: ﬁat money
Md
t and a nominal state contingent claims, Dt+1, that pay one unit of currency in a speciﬁed state of period
t +1 .
6The “unit-root” problem arises in small open economy models by the popular assumption of making the subjective discount
factor (β) constant and equal to the factor 1
1+rt , that depends on the international interest rate (rt). This assumption introduces
a random walk in equilibrium consumption making the steady state dependent on the initial stock of wealth. As a result the
presence of a unit root in a dynamical system implies that it is not valid to apply the common technique of linearizing the
system around the steady state and studying the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix in order to characterize local determinacy.
See Azariadis (1993). Complete markets is one of the possible approaches to solve the ”unit-root” problem. See Schmitt-Grohé
and Uribe (2003).
6Under the assumption of complete markets the representative agent’s ﬂow constraint each period can be
written as7
Md
t + EtQt,t+1Dt+1 ≤ Wt + EtyT
t + PN
t yN




where Qt,t+1 refers to the period-t price of a claim to one unit of currency delivered in a particular state of
period t +1divided by the probability of occurrence of that state and conditional of information available
in period t. Hence EtQt,t+1Dt+1 denotes the cost of all contingent claims bought at the beginning of period
t. Constraint (8) says that the total end-of-period nominal value of the ﬁnancial assets can be worth no
more than the value of the ﬁnancial wealth brought into the period, Wt,p l u sn o n - ﬁnancial income during
the period net of the value of taxes, Etτt , and the value of consumption spending.
To derive the period-by-period budget constraint of the representative agent, it is important to notice
that total beginning-of-period wealth in the following period is given by
Wt+1 = Md
t + Dt+1 (9)
and that EtQt,t+1 corresponds to the price at period t of a claim that pays one unit of currency in every





Then we can use equations (8), (9) and (10) to derive the budget constraint of the representative agent as
EtQt,t+1Wt+1 ≤ Wt + EtyT
t + PN
t yN








w h oi sa l s os u b j e c tt oaN o n - P o n zi game condition described by
lim
j→∞
Etqt+jWt+j ≥ 0 (12)
at all dates and under all contingencies. The variable qt represents the period-zero price of one unit of
currency to be delivered in a particular state of period t divided by the probability of occurrence of that
state, given information available at time 0. It is given by
qt = Q1Q2.....Qt
with q0 ≡ 1.







t=0 in order to maximize (1) subject to (2), (11) and (12), and given W0, and the time paths
for it, Et, PN
t ,Q t+1 and τt. Note that since the utility function speciﬁed in (1) implies that the preferences
of the agent display non-sasiation then constraints (11) and (12) both hold with equality.





















































where λt/Et corresponds to the multiplier of the budget constraint.
The interpretation of the ﬁrst order conditions is straightforward. Equation (13) is the usual intertemporal
envelope condition that makes the marginal utility of consumption of traded goods equal to the marginal
utility of wealth (λt). Condition (14) implies that the marginal rate of substitution between traded and
non-traded goods must be equal to the real exchange rate. In addition, from equations (15) and (16) it is












that equalizes the value of the marginal products of labor in both sectors. Equation (17) represents the
demand for real balances of money as an increasing function of consumption of traded goods and a decreasing
function of the risk-free gross nominal interest rate. And ﬁnally condition (18) implies a standard pricing
equation for one-step-ahead nominal contingent claims. Note that under complete markets in each period t
there is one condition of this type for each possible state in period t +1 .
2.2 The Government
The government issues two nominal liabilities: money, Ms
t , and a domestic bond, Bs
t, that pays a gross
free-risk nominal interest rate Rt. We assume that it cannot issue or hold state contingent assets. It also
levies taxes, τt, pays interest on its debt, (Rt − 1)Bs
t, and receives revenues from seigniorage.
To derive the budget constraint of the government we proceed as follows. Let Ls
t denote the nominal
government liabilities at the beginning of period t.I nt h eﬁnancial market of period t the government issues





Using this deﬁnition and the aforementioned assumptions about the behavior of the government we can
write its budget constraint as
Ls
t = Rt−1Ls
t−1 − (Rt−1 − 1)Ms
t−1 − Etτt (19)
8We assume that the government follows a Ricardian ﬁscal policy. Under this policy, it picks the path of











Finally we deﬁne the monetary policy as an interest rate feedback rule or Taylor rule whereby the
government can set the nominal interest rate, Rt,a sa ni n c r e a s i n gf u n c t ion of either the CPI-inﬂation rate
between periods t − 1 and t, πt,o rt h eC P I - i n ﬂation rate between periods t and t +1 ,π t+1. Hence the ﬁrst
rule corresponds to a contemporaneous rule whereas the second one corresponds to a forward-looking rule.
For analytical and computational purposes we will focus on the following speciﬁc parametrization





; with j =0 ,1 and R∗ = π∗/β (21)
where π∗ corresponds to the target rate of the CPI-inﬂation. We will assume that the government responds




It is important to observe that the interest rate rule is a continuous and non-decreasing function in the
CPI-inﬂation rate. In addition it satisﬁes the zero bound on the nominal interest rate, Rt = ρ(πt+1) > 1.
3 The Equilibrium
In equilibrium the money market and the non-traded goods market clear. Therefore
Md
t = Ms
















t,t+1 refers to the period-t foreign currency price of a claim to one unit of foreign currency delivered
in a particular state of period t +1divided by the probability of occurrence of that state and conditional
of information available in period t. Furthermore under the assumption of complete markets we also have a

















t represents the marginal utility of wealth for the rest of the world, PT∗
t is the foreign price of traded
goods, that we assumed to be normalized to one, and β
∗ denotes the subjective discount rate of the rest of
the world. Using (18), (24), (25), the Law of One Price for traded goods and the assumption that β
∗ = β










9that holds at all dates and under all contingencies. This equation implies that the domestic marginal utility




where ξ refers to a constant parameters that determines the wealth diﬀerence across countries. Since we are
dealing with a small open economy, λ
∗
t can be taken as an exogenous variable. To simplify the analysis we
assume that λ
∗
t is constant and equal to λ
∗. This assumption implies that λt becomes a constant. That is
λt = λ = ξλ
∗ (26)
















where E denotes the expectation operator. Note that condition (27) is very similar to the uncovered interest
parity condition.
It is important to observe that to pursue the determinacy of equilibrium analysis, it is suﬃcient to
focus on a perfect foresight equilibrium. Assuming that the representative agent forecasts correctly all the
anticipated variables, we can write condition (27) as
Rt = β
−1 t+1 (28)
that corresponds to the typical uncovered interest parity condition.
We proceed giving the deﬁnition of a perfect foresight equilibrium for a government that pursues a
Ricardian ﬁscal policy and follows an interest rate feedback rule.
Deﬁnition 1 Given, L0 and π∗, a Perfect Foresight Equilibrium under a Ricardian ﬁscal policy is deﬁned




t ,M t,λ t,L t+1,τ t,e t, Et,  t,π t,π N
t ,R t}∞
t=0 satisfying deﬁnitions (4),
(5), (7), the ﬁrst order conditions of the representative agent (13), (14), (15), (16), (17), the intertemporal
version of (19) together with (20), the rule deﬁned by (21), the market clearing conditions (22), (23), and
conditions (26), and (28).
To pursue the equilibrium analysis the model can be further reduced. It is important to observe that
we do not need to consider in the analysis equations (15), (16), (17), (19) and (20). The reasons are the
followings. Under the assumption that the ﬁscal policy is Ricardian, we know that the intertemporal version
of the government’s budget constraint in conjunction with its transversality condition will be always satisﬁed.
Moreover once we determine the paths for the risk-free gross nominal interest rate and consumption of traded
goods we can use conditions (17) and (22) to obtain the sequence of the stock of money. Utilizing the market
clearing condition for non-traded goods and conditions (15), (16), and (26) allows us to ﬁnd out the paths
for labor allocated in the traded sector and labor allocated in the non-traded sector once we determine the
paths for the real exchange rate and consumption of non-traded goods.
10Using deﬁnitions (5) and (7), conditions (13), (14), (16), (23), (26) and (28), and the contemporaneous
version of the monetary rule (21) we can derive the following diﬀerence equation that summarizes and



















(1 − α)(1 − γ)(1 − σ)(1 − θN)
{(1 − γ)+γ[θN(1 − α)+α]}(1 − σ) − 1
(30)
On the other hand, using deﬁnitions (5) and (7), conditions (13), (14), (16), (23), (26) and (28), and
the forward-looking version of the monetary rule (21) we can derive the following diﬀerence equation that

















where χ was deﬁned in (30).
Using deﬁnitions (5) and (7), the interest rate rule (21) and equation (29), or equation (31), it is straight-
forward to notice that in steady-state and regardless of the type of rule under analysis (contemporaneous or
forward-looking) we have
¯ πN =¯   =¯ π
¯ R = ρ(¯ π)=¯ π/β (32)
Figure 1 depicts the left- and the right-hands side of equation ρ(π)=π/β using the particular functional
form (21). From this ﬁgure it is clear that there are two steady states. Under the ﬁrst one the steady-state
CPI-inﬂation rate corresponds to ¯ π = π∗ and the slope of the interest rate rule is ρ0 (π∗)= A
π∗, which is
greater than 1




π∗ > 1 and following
Leeper (1991) we say that the monetary policy rule is “active”. That is, in response to a one percent increase
in the CPI-inﬂation, the government raises the nominal interest rate by more than one percent leading to an
increase in the real interest rate. On the other hand, under the second steady state, the CPI-inﬂation rate
corresponds to ¯ π = πL and the slope of the interest rate rule is ρ0 ¡
πL¢
= A
πL, w h i c hi sl e s st h a n 1
β. Hence at




β and following Leeper (1991) we say that
the monetary policy rule is “passive”. In this case in response to a one percent increase in the CPI-inﬂation,
the government raises the nominal interest rate by less than one percent leading to a decrease in the real
interest rate.
The existence of two steady states is crucial for our dynamics results.8 In addition it is important to
observe that the steady state equation (32) in this small open economy model corresponds to the same
steady state equation that arises in closed economy models such as in Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe
(2002). However this does not imply that the dynamics of the small economy model under interest rate rules









Figure 1: Multiplicity of steady states. π∗ represents the target inﬂation rate or the inﬂation rate in the
active steady-state whereas πL represents the inﬂation rate in the passive steady state.
must be equal to the dynamics of the closed economy models. For instance the equilibrium dynamics of the
contemporaneous rule model are driven by equation (29) that diﬀers from the equation derived in Benhabib
et al. in the exponent χ (deﬁned in (30)). In their model this exponent is always positive. In our model
this exponent can be positive or negative and depends on some additional structural parameters of the small
open economy such as the degree of openness of the economy, α. This fact leads to much richer dynamics
as we will discuss below.
For the above reasons, it is helpful to summarize how the “driving” parameter χ is aﬀected by the
relative risk aversion coeﬃcient, σ, and by the degree of openness, α, s i n c ew ew i l lb es p e c i ﬁcally considering
environments diﬀering with respect to those coeﬃcients.9
To simplify the exposition, let χ(α,σ)=
(1−θN)(1−γ)(1−α)(σ−1)
1+(σ−1) (α) where  (α)=[ γ (α +( 1− α)θN)+( 1− γ)] ∈
(0,1). We study the function χ(α,σ). It is straightforward to prove the following facts:
Fact 1: χ(1,σ)=χ(α,1) = 0.
Fact 2: if σ ∈ (0,1) then χ(α,σ) < 0 for any α ∈ (0,1).





[1+(σ−1) (α)]2 > 0 for any α ∈ (0,1).
9The parameter χ also depends on the relative importance of real money balances in transactions, γ, a n do nt h en o n - t r a d e d
sector production parameter θN. However we will not pursue any “bifurcation of equilibria” analysis with respect to them. The
message we want to convey in this paper is that the degree of openness in economies pursuing CPI-inﬂation targeting can play
ab i gr o l e .A si tt u r n so u t ,s u c he ﬀect is present or not depending on the relative risk aversion coeﬃcient. Of the remaining
parameters the share of real money balances in the utility function aﬀects the nature of equilibria (more on this below). We
will pursue a sensitivity analysis with respect to this parameter.




[1+(σ−1) (α)]2 < 0.




[1+(σ−1) (α)]2 > 0.
Facts 2 and 3 make the point that the sign of χ depends on the relative risk-aversion coeﬃcient. The
remaining facts describe how χ is aﬀected by this coeﬃcient and by the degree of openness of the economy.
4 The Equilibrium Analysis Under a Contemporaneous Taylor
Rule
In this paper, we focus on rules that are active at the intended target steady state inﬂation rate, π∗.F o rt h e
time being passive rules will not be at the center of our discussion. For both the contemporaneous and the
forward looking policy set-ups, the equilibrium analysis is made of two parts. First we will check if active
interest rate rules are suﬃcient for the local determinacy of equilibrium of the target steady state. Active
rules have been strongly advocated by monetary economics academics as being simple, transparent and above
all stabilizing, in particular for what concerns closed economies. Then, we will question the robustness of
local results by studying the full global dynamics of the model.
We will start by analyzing active contemporaneous interest rate rules with respect to the CPI-inﬂation. In
order to motivate them we remember the estimations by Lubik and Schorfheide (2003) of contemporaneous
rules for United kingdom, Canada, Australia and New Zealand.
4.1 Local Analysis












The following proposition summarizes the local determinacy of equilibrium analysis for contemporaneous
rules.




R∗ > 1, with R∗ = π∗
β , and let χ be deﬁned as in (30).
1. If σ ∈ (0,1) then the model displays a unique local equilibrium.






then the model displays a unique equilibrium. On the






then the model displays multiple equilibria.
Proof. To prove this proposition we use (33). For 1 note that if σ<1 then from Fact 2, we conclude
that χ<0. This result and the zero bound on the nominal interest rate imply that
χ
R∗−1 < 0. This inequality
and the assumption of an active rule, that is A










> 1.B u tt h i sm e a n s
that the mapping (33) becomes explosive. This feature of the mapping in conjunction with the fact that Rt
13is a non-predetermined variable imply that there exists a unique equilibrium that corresponds to the active
steady state.
For 2 note that if σ>1 then from Fact 3 we derive that χ>0. This result and the zero bound
on the nominal interest rate imply that
χ
R∗−1 > 0. S i n c et h er u l ei sa c t i v e ,R∗
A < 1,w eh a v et oc o n s i d e r











R∗−1 < 1. We proceed by analyzing each case.
For case a,s i n c e
χ
R∗−1 > 1 and R∗
A < 1, then R∗
A < 1 <
χ











< 1 which means that the mapping (33) becomes non-explosive. This feature of the
mapping in conjunction with the fact that Rt is a non-predetermined variable imply that there exist multiple
equilibria in which Rt converges asymptotically to its steady state.




A < 1, then we can derive that
χ
R∗−1 < R∗











> 1, which means that the mapping (33) becomes explosive and by a similar
analysis to the one before we conclude that the model displays a unique equilibrium.
Finally for case c,s i n c eR∗
A <
χ



































Therefore the mapping (33) becomes non-explosive and the model displays multiple equilibria. On the
















< −1. Hence the aforementioned mapping becomes explosive and the model displays a unique
equilibrium.
Summarizing, we have that for σ>1, if R∗












then there exists multiple equilibria. On the other hand, if
χ
R∗−1 < R∗
A < 1 or R∗
A <
χ







then there exist a unique equilibrium. Hence part 2 of Proposition 1 follows.
The results stated in Proposition 1 point out that conditions under which contemporaneous interest rate
rules induce aggregate instability in the small open economy by generating local multiple equilibria depend
not only on the interest rate response coeﬃcient to the CPI-inﬂation. They also depend on some structural
parameters such as the relative risk aversion coeﬃcient, σ, and other parameters that aﬀect χ such as the
degree of openness, α.
In particular, for a very low relative risk aversion coeﬃcient (σ<1) an active interest rate rule will
lead to a unique equilibrium regardless of the values of the other structural parameters of the model. On
the other hand, for a very high relative risk aversion coeﬃcient (σ>1), an active interest rate rule may
destabilize the economy depending on the values of some other structural parameters and how they aﬀect χ.
As was mentioned above we are interested in understanding how the equilibrium dynamics of the small open
economy varies with respect to the relative risk aversion coeﬃcient σ, and the degree of openness, α.I nt h i s
s e n s ew ed e ﬁned the function χ(α,σ). To grasp the role that α may play in the determinacy of equilibrium
analysis consider the following extreme cases as a ﬁrst approximation. Assume that σ>1 and that there is
a value for the degree of openness of the economy ˆ α ∈ (0,1) such that given the other structural parameters






. First, if the economy is extremely open, that is α → 1, then
χ → 0 by Fact 1. Hence by part 2 of Proposition 1 the model displays a unique equilibrium. Second, if the







But by part 2 of Proposition 1 this means that the model displays multiple equilibria.
Focusing on the plane α vs σ we can derive formally the local equilibrium frontier, αI(σ). This frontier
divides the aforementioned plane into regions of values of the degree of openness, α, and the relative risk
aversion coeﬃcient, σ, under which the model displays local multiple equilibria or a local unique equilibrium
for active contemporaneous interest rate rules. A suﬃcient and necessary condition for the existence of such












(1 − σ)(1 − γ)(1 − θN)
[1 − γ(1 − θN)](1 − σ) − 1
(34)
We are going to make this Assumption 1 and carry it throughout the paper, both for local and global
analysis. As can be seen the validity of this assumption depends on the parameter γ, among others, that
measures the importance of money for transaction purposes (more on this below).






and using Assumption 1 we can
characterize it explicitly in the following proposition.






and let χ(0,σ) be deﬁned as in





















Moreover it satisﬁes lim
σ→σI∗αI(σ)=0and lim
σ→∞αI(σ)=αI∗,w h e r eαI∗ ≡ 1 − ΥI
[1−ΥI(1−γ)](1−θN) ∈ (0,1).
Proof. See Appendix.
A graphical description of the local equilibrium frontier is given by Figure 2, with respect to the driving
parameters α and σ. From Figure 2 one might conclude that given σ<σ I∗ the rule always guarantees a
local unique equilibrium as long as the government implements an active monetary policy. In addition one
might derive the same conclusion for very open economies (high α) and regardless of the relative risk aversion
coeﬃcient.10 In other words, given the relative risk aversion coeﬃcient, the more open the economy is the
more likely is that an active rule leads to a unique equilibrium. It is in this sense that an active interest rate
rule might be viewed as stabilizing11.
10In fact this result is more general since a quick inspection of Proposition 1 suggests that if the the economy is very open,
an active rule leads to a unique equilibrium regardless of the values of the other structural parameters.
11This result might seems controversial given some result from the closed economy literature on Taylor rules. In our model, as
the economy gets very closed (α → 0),f o rs u ﬃciently high risk aversion, active rules deliver indeterminacy (which contrasts with
the general optimistic view on aggressive targeting). However, as Benhabib et al. (2001a) have pointed out, the ability of active
rules to deliver stability depends on whether consumption and real money balances are complements or substitutes. In our
model, real money balances and consumption may be Edgeworth substitutes Ucm < 0 or Edgeworth complements Ucm > 0. Our





























Figure 2: Local equilibrium analysis for an active contemporaneous interest rate rule. This ﬁgure shows the
local equilibrium regions. M stands for local multiple equilibria and U stands for a local unique equilibrium.
α corresponds to the degree of openness of the economy and σ denotes the relative risk aversion coeﬃcient.
By sticking to local dynamics, one might conclude that active rules are likely to deliver unique equilibria
(and therefore real stability) for most parametrizations. In particular, central banks seem to have an “easy”
task in quite open economies. The point of this paper is to show that this is not necessarily the case under
a global equilibrium analysis. The economy might be likely to end up on a variety of other dynamic paths,
all consistent with rational expectation equilibria. The next section pursues the analysis.
4.2 Global Dynamics

















that characterizes the equilibrium path of the gross nominal interest rate Rt. The object of this section is
to study the equilibrium paths consistent with this diﬀerence equation. We will show how the degree of
openness (α) and the relative risk aversion coeﬃcient (σ) are fundamental to understand the stability of the
steady state equilibria and the dynamic behavior of the non-stationary paths converging to them. To start


















16The dynamic equation is therefore summarized by
K (Rt+1)=J (Rt)
The multiple steady states result motivates us to look for saddle path connections between the low and the
high inﬂation stationary points. Clearly if K were monotonic we would have well-deﬁned forward dynamics.
Well-deﬁned backward dynamics would result if J were monotonic instead. Studying the behavior of those
two functions is therefore a ﬁrst necessary step for global results.
Lemma 3 Consider the function J (R) deﬁned in (37), with R>1 (the zero-bound condition). The follow-
ings hold:













In order to study the behavior of function K it is useful to deﬁne the properties of another function
deﬁned as αp(σ). The reason is that this function that divides the plane α vs σ into two regions will deﬁne
the values of α and σ for which the function K is either strictly decreasing or hump-shaped. The function
αp(σ) is implicitly deﬁned by χ(α,σ)=R∗−1
A and using Assumption 1 we can characterize it explicitly in
the following Lemma.12
Lemma 4 Consider the plane α vs σ, deﬁne Υp ≡ R∗−1
A and let χ(0,σ) be deﬁned as in (34). Under





















Moreover it satisﬁes lim
σ→σp∗αp(σ)=0and lim
σ→∞αp(σ)=αp∗ where αp∗ ≡ 1 − Υp
[1−Υp(1−γ)](1−θN) ∈ (0,1). In
addition αp∗ >α I∗ and σp∗ <σ I∗, where αI∗ and σI∗ were deﬁned in Proposition 2.
Proof. See Appendix.
A graphical representation of the frontier αp(σ) c a nb es e e ni nF i g u r e2 . U s i n gt h ed e ﬁnition of the
frontier αp(σ) in the plane α vs σ, it is possible to pursue the characterization of the function K in the
following manner.
Lemma 5 Consider the function K (R) deﬁned in (36), with R>1, and recall the deﬁnitions of αp(σ), σp∗,
and Υp in Lemma 4. The followings hold:
12In the Lemma we use Assumption 1. This assumption is more than we need to have a well-deﬁned function αp(σ). In fact
we only need that
(1−γ)(1−θN)
1−γ(1−θN) > R∗−1
A . However we keep Assumption 1 to be able to compare the results from the local
equilibrium analysis with the results from the global equilibrium analysis.






2. Assume σ>1 then
(a) for any σ ∈ (1,σp∗) and α ∈ (0,1) or for any σ ∈ [σp∗,∞) such that α ≥ αp(σ),K(R) is strictly
decreasing;




We can now deﬁne some parametric zones with respect to α and σ within which the equilibrium dynamics
will be extensively studied. In order to accomplish this task it is important to notice the following. For the
values of the parameters α and σ deﬁn e di np a r t2 ( a )o fL e m m a5 ,J (R) peaks at RJ =1+χ and K (R) is
monotonically decreasing with respect to R. From the steady state analysis we know that they meet twice, at
the target interest rate R∗ and at RL <R ∗. The higher steady state has to occur on the decreasing portion
of the function J (R). The lower steady state intersection can instead occur both above, below or at RJ
(namely, both on the increasing, decreasing or peaking portion of J). In other words we can have RL R RJ.
The equilibrium dynamics will be substantially diﬀerent according to which case we will be considering.
Since RJ =1+χ(α,σ) we need to study the parametric ranges of α and σ over which 1+χ(α,σ) R RL or
equivalently χ(α,σ) R RL − 1. This implies we have to deﬁne a new frontier or curve αT(σ) that describes
the values of α and σ such that χ(α,σ)=RL − 1.
We will also make another assumption that seems empirically reasonable13.





Using Assumptions 1 and 2 we can characterize the frontier αT(σ) in the following Lemma.
Lemma 6 Consider the plane α vs σ, deﬁne ΥT ≡ RL − 1 and let χ(0,σ) be deﬁned as in (34). Under





















Moreover it satisﬁes lim
σ→σT∗αT(σ)=0and lim
σ→∞αT(σ)=αT∗,w h e r eαT∗ ≡ 1− ΥT
[1−ΥT(1−γ)](1−θN) ∈ (0,1). In
addition αT∗ >α p∗ and σT∗ <σ p∗,w h e r eαp∗ and σp∗ were deﬁned in Lemma 4.
Proof. See Appendix.
Figure 2 shows the αT(σ) frontier. With this ﬁgure we can study the regions for which RJ =1 + χ(α,σ) R
RL. Note that since αT(σ) describes all the feasible combinations of σ and α such that χ(α,σ)=RL−1 then
we can pursue the following analysis. Take a pair (σT,α T) such that χ
¡
αT,σT¢
= RL−1. Given Fact 5 any










other words for any σ ≥ σT∗ and any α ≥ αT(σ), we have that the function K (R) meets twice the function








18J (R) in its decreasing part. This analysis, Lemmas 4 and 6 and Propositions 3 and 5 allow us to divide the
parametric space α vs σ i n t o6z o n e s : 14
1. Zone 1: σ ∈ (0,1) and α ∈ (0,1). Both J (R) and K (R) are strictly decreasing and meet twice.
2. Zone 2: σ ∈ (1,σT∗) and α ∈ (0,1).K(R) is strictly decreasing and J (R) is hump-shaped but K (R)
cuts J (R) at RL and R∗, both on the decreasing side of J (R).
3. Zone 3: σ ≥ σT∗ and α ∈ [αT(σ),1). The properties of K (R) and J (R) are the same as in Zone 2,
with RL = RJ over αT(σ).
4. Zone 4: σ ∈ (σT∗,σp∗) and α ∈ (0,α T(σ)).K(R) is strictly decreasing and J (R) is hump-shaped. But
K (R) cuts J (R) at RL <R J and R∗ >R J.
5. Zone 5: σ ≥ σp∗ and α ∈ [αp (σ),α T (σ)). The properties of K (R) and J (R) are the same as in Zone
4.
6. Zone 6: σ>σ p∗ and α ∈ (0,α p (σ)). Both J (K) and K (R) are hump-shaped.
The next step is to show that within each of those zones we can face very diﬀerent dynamics. We will be
spelling out clearly what additional assumptions (mostly suﬃcient ones) will be needed to get endogenous
cycles and chaotic dynamics. The point of this work is in fact to show that rich dynamics are likely to occur
not that they occur for sure. We will be focusing on equilibrium dynamics for initial conditions between the
two steady states
From simple inspection of the parametric zones it looks like we have left the case σ =1out of the picture.
This is the standard log-utility case, where utility is separable with respect to all its arguments. It can be
easily shown that in that case no interesting dynamics will occur other than the standard closed economy
liquidity trap of Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2002). Technically it is important to clarify that in our
model a standard liquidity trap corresponds to a case in which given an initial nominal interest rate between
the two steady-states, the nominal interest rate converges monotonically to the lower steady-state. We refer
to this case as a liquidity trap following Benhabib et al (2001b, 2002). They argue that the dynamical
features of the aformentioned converging path resembles the dynamical properties of a standard liquidity
trap.
We start by showing the possibility of liquidity traps.
Proposition 7 Standard liquidity traps or deﬂationary paths, i.e. interest rate equilibrium paths converging
asymptotically to the lower steady state for any R0 ∈
¡
RL,R ∗¢
, occur if the pair (σ,α) belongs either to
Zone 1,2, or 3 (see Figure 3 and use the aforementioned deﬁnitions of the zones).




the following features: 1) f0 (Rt) > 0 for any Rt > 1; 2) f0 (R∗) > 1;3 )f0 ¡
RL¢
< 1; 4) f (Rt) <R t (a simple
graph makes the arguments clear). Point 1) follows from applying the Implicit Function Theorem: f0 (Rt)=
J0(Rt)
K(Rt+1) < 0. Point 2) and 3) follow from computing
J0(Rt)
K(Rt+1) at Rt+1 = Rt = R∗ and Rt+1 = Rt = RL. To
prove point 4) take R0 ∈
¡
RL,R ∗¢
.R 0 = f (R0) is deﬁned by K (R0)=J (R0). But also K (R0) <J(R0).








Figure 3: Graphs of the functions J and K to study the dynamics of the model in Zones 1, 2, and 3. See
Proposition 7. This is the standard liquidity traps case. Dynamics are similar if the leftmost crossing point
of J and K was to the right of function J’s peak
Since K is monotonically decreasing R0 = f(R0) <R 0. Since R0 was taken arbitrarily, the result follows.




should converge to a point within the set. The unique stationary point below R0 is RL. A standard liquidity
trap occurs: the economy is driven asymptotically to the passive (low inﬂation) steady state.
The next few propositions will focus on Zone 4 and 5. Within these zones K is monotonically decreasing.
Forward dynamics are then well deﬁned. However, the hump-shaped behavior of J creates opportunities
for complex erratic paths. For degrees of openness and risk aversion within those ranges deﬁn e di nt h e
aformentioned zones we will show that both two-period cycle equilibria and chaotic dynamics (cyclical orbits
of any periodicity) are possible.
It is important to observe that the parametric zones deﬁned above do not divide the parametric space α
vs σ between “zones with standard liquidity traps occurring with probability one” and “zones with cycles and
chaos occurring with probability one”. Zones 1, 2, and 3 simply can not have cyclical or chaotic equilibria.
A necessary (but not suﬃcient) condition for oscillating equilibria to occur is that the implicitly forward
looking mapping deﬁned in (35) be not monotonic. That is, it must have at least one critical point: a peak




formally, within zones 4 and 5 we will be looking for some kind of “ﬂip bifurcations”, namely for parameters
deﬁning thresholds above/below which the steady states loose/gain stability. 15
In order to proceed with the analysis, deﬁne R and e R implicitly as follows:
15Another kind of bifurcation would be to check for parametric thresholds such that we observe the appearance and disap-
pearance of steady states. Clearly this can not be the case here over the “risk aversion-openness space” since steady states have















Given the fact that for zones 4 and 5 K (R) is monotonically decreasing and that within these zones RL <R J,
we have that R <R J. The hump-shaped J (R) guarantees that e R<R ∗ (see Figure 4). We have to consider
the three cases R R e R separately. The idea here is to show that an attractive set exists under diﬀerent
parametrizations and that within such a set cycles and chaos are likely to occur.




Proposition 8 If Assumption 3 is satisﬁed, the followings hold:




,R t ∈ (R,R ∗).
2 .P e r i o d2c y c l e se x i s t sw i t h i ns u c hs e t .
3. Topological chaotic dynamics, in a Li-Yorke sense are possible.
Proof.
1. The proof is trivial and therefore omitted.




































Since the mapping f is continous, there exists a point Ru ∈
¡
RJ,R ∗¢
such that g(Ru)=0 . The
period-2 cycle is then {Rl,R u}, with Rl = f (Ru) ∈
¡
R,R L¢
(this is left to the reader).




g0 (R∗) < 0. But now g(R) ≤ 0 and g
¡
RJ¢
R 0 If g
¡
RJ¢





If it is g
¡
RJ¢
< 0, then as before there exists a point Ru ∈
¡
RJ,R ∗¢




> 0, there is no guarantee that the function g has an additional zero. A
suﬃcient (but not necessary) condition is that g0 ¡
RL¢








K(RL) < −1. It can be shown that such









. This implies the existence of
ap o i n tRu ∈
¡
RL,R J¢
such that g(Ru)=0 .
16If fmin = f
¡
RJ¢
< e R there is not non-trivial mapping-invariant set. This case displays a diﬀerent type of multiplicity.
I tc a nb es h o w nt h a tt h e r ee x i s ts e to fp o i n tw i t h i nt h em a p p i n g - i n v a r i a n ts e tt h a tl e a v es u c has e ta f t e raﬁnite number of
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< 0. and h0 (R∗) < 0 We




be such that K
¡
RJ¢
= J (Rc), in other words Rc is the pre-image of RJ. We will
have that RJ = f (Rc),R= f2 (Rc) <R J <R c and R∗ = f3 (Rc) >R c. The Li-Yorke suﬃcient
condition is satisﬁed. Furthermore, since the function h is continous, h
¡
RJ¢
< 0 and h0 (R∗) < 0,




=0for some b R ∈
¡
RJ,R ∗¢
. A period-3 cycles exists and by Sarkovskii’s
Theorem cycles of any orbit exist.
(b) As above h
¡
RL¢
= h(R∗)=0and h0 (R∗) < 0. But now h
¡
RJ¢











< 0 by continuity of the function there exists a
zero of h between RJ and R∗, and since h0 ¡
RL¢
> 0 there is also a zero between RL and RJ. In
any case a period-3 cycles occurs. In both cases because of Sarkovskii’s Theorem cycles of any








≤ 0 is suﬃcient to have chaotic dinamics.
To conclude, in this section we showed that apart from standard liquidity traps, active contemporaneous
interest rate rules in small open economies can generate very complex dynamics for plausible parametric
ranges. We showed that contemporaneous inﬂation targeting can produce both monotonically and cyclically
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The reader has probably noticed that we did not cover zone 6 in details. Within this zone both the K and
the J functions are hump-shaped. This case is isomorphic to the case studied by Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohé
and Uribe (2002) in the closed economy set-up. It can be easily shown that under some assumptions chaotic
dynamics and cycles can arise around the active steady state. The proofs of this results are omitted in this
version of the paper but are available upon request from the authors.
4.3 Local Uniqueness vs. Global Multiplicity
To what extent local and global dynamics analyses can lead to conﬂicting results? Figure 6 puts together
our local and global analysis results.
By sticking to local dynamics (around the target steady state), we would conclude that the “Taylor
principle” of active monetary policy leads to stability for any degree of openness, α,a sl o n ga st h er e l a t i v e
risk aversion coeﬃcient, σ, stays below a threshold σI∗ with σI∗ > 1; and for any degree of openness above
some function αI(σ) with domain σ ∈ [σI∗,∞).
On the other hand, by studying the whole dynamics we found that within those local uniqueness ranges,
monotonic deﬂations, cyclical and chaotic equilibria can occur. It is interesting to see how openness aﬀects
the dynamics for σ>σ p∗. For very closed economies, cycles/chaos around the active steady state can occur.
In other words, the economy is highly unstable but without risks of falling into deﬂationary paths. As the
economy opens more, speciﬁcally above some threshold αp(σ), the probability of entering vicious deﬂationary
spirals become positive. The economy is not only highly unstable but might end up in a liquidity trap (cyclical
or monotonic). In other words, given the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion, we have shown that the more
open the economy is, the more likely is that a contemporaneous active rule will drive the economy into a
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Figure 6: Equilibrium analysis for an active contemporaneous interest rate rule. This ﬁgure shows a compar-
ison between the local equilibrium analysis and the global equilibrium analysis. M stands for local multiple
equilibria and U stands for a local unique equilibrium. α corresponds to the degree of openness of the
economy and σ denotes the relative risk aversion coeﬃcient.
lead to cycles and chaotic dynamics around the inﬂation target.
We can conﬁrm these theoretical results pursuing a calibration-simulation exercise. We set the time unit
to be a quarter and use Canada as the representative economy. From Mendoza (1995) we borrow the labor
income shares for the non-traded sector θN. The steady-state inﬂation, π∗, and the steady state nominal
interest rate, R∗, are calculated as the average of the CPI-inﬂation and the Central Bank discount rate
between 1983-2002. Then the subjective discount rate is calculated as β = π∗/R∗. We use the estimate of
Lubik and Schorfheide (2003) for the Canadian interest rate response coeﬃcient to inﬂation, A
R∗.E s t i m a t e s
for the share of expenditures on real money balances, 1 − γ, for Canada are not available.17 For the United
States, estimates of this parameter vary from 0.0146 to 0.039 depending on the speciﬁcation of the utility
function and method of estimation.18 We set 1 − γ equal to 0.03 and will pursue a sensitivity analysis with
respect to this parameter. Table 2 presents the values of the parameters.
Table 2: Parametrization







I no u ra n a l y s i sw ew i l lv a r yt h ed e g r e eo fo p e n n e s so ft h ee c o n o m y ,α, and the relative risk aversion
17Imrohoroglu (1994) presents some estimates of currency substitution between the Canadian dollar and the U.S. dollar, but
in our model only domestic money enters into the utility function.
18See Poterba and Rotemberg (1987), Finn, Hoﬀman and Schlagenhauf (1990) and Holman (1998).
24coeﬃcient, σ. However an estimate for Canada of the former parameter can be obtained using the average
imports to GDP share during 1983-2002. This yields α =0 .31. In contrast an estimate of the relative risk
aversion coeﬃcient is more diﬃcult to obtain. The RBC literature usually sets this parameter to 2.19 Since
setting this parameter immediately implies to assume that consumption and real money balances are either
Edgeworth substitutes or complements we will use diﬀerent values. That is σ ∈ {0.8,2,2.5}.
Using this parametrization we can show quantitatively how misleading the local equilibrium analysis for
active contemporaneous rules is. Setting σ =2 .5 and using the parameters in Table 2 we can calculate
σI∗ =3 .14.S i n c e σ =2 .5 <σ I∗ =3 .14 then doing a local equilibrium analysis and using Figure 6 we
would conclude that the active contemporaneous rule is not destabilizing since it leads to a unique local
equilibrium. However the global equilibrium analysis conveys a diﬀerent message. In Figure 7 we present the
global dynamics of the model for diﬀerent degrees of openness α ∈ {0.01,0.37,0.90}. It basically shows the
ﬁrst three iterates of the diﬀerence equation (29), which describes the equilibrium dynamics for the nominal
interest rate. In all the panels the straight line corresponds to the 45o degree line. In particular notice
that for α = {0.01,0.37} , almost closed and open economies respectively, the second and third iterates,
Rt+2 = f2(Rt) and Rt+3 = f3(Rt), have ﬁxed points diﬀerent from the steady state values R∗ and RL.
This implies that there exist two and three period cycles. By Sarkovskii’s (1964) theorem, the existence
of three-period cycles implies that the map F has cycles of any periodicity. Furthermore by Li and Yorke
(1975), the existence of three-period cycles implies chaos. However it is important to observe that there
is a diﬀerence in terms of the dynamics of the almost closed economy (α =0 .01)a n dt h eo p e ne c o n o m y
(α =0 .37). Whereas in the former cycles and chaos arise around the active steady state. In the latter these
types of dynamics are present around the passive steady state. On the other hand for very open economies
(α =0 .90), no cycles and chaotic dynamics appear. Only deﬂationary paths (liquidity traps) converging to
the passive steady state are possible.
Finally, it is important to mention the relevance of Assumption 2 in the global analysis. This assumption
assures the existence of cycles and chaos around the passive steady state. If we relax it, that is if we assume




, then the aforementioned dynamics are not present in the global analysis. In
other words, the model only displays standard liquidity traps and cycles and chaos around the active steady
state.
5 The Equilibrium Analysis Under a Forward- Looking Taylor
Rule
We proceed to study forward-looking interest rate rules with respect to the CPI-inﬂation. In order to motivate
them we remember the estimations by Clarida Gali and Gertler (1998) of forward-looking rules for United
kingdom, Germany, France, Italy and Japan; and the estimations by Corbo(2000) for Chile, Colombia, Peru,
Costa Rica and El Salvador.
19See Mendoza (1991) among others.
25Figure 7: Active Contemporaneous Interest Rate Rules. This graph shows that depending on the degree of
openness of the economy (α) two-period cycles and three-period cycles around the active and the passive
steady states are possible.
5.1 Local Analysis
In order to pursue a local determinacy of equilibrium analysis for forward-looking interest rate rules we










The following proposition summarizes the local determinacy of equilibrium analysis for forward-looking rules.




R∗ > 1 and let χ be deﬁned as in (30),
1. if σ<1 then the model displays a unique equilibrium.







then the model displays a unique equilibrium. On the






then the model displays multiple equilibria.
Proof. To prove this proposition we use (38). For 1 note that if σ<1 then from Fact 2, we conclude
that χ<0. This result and the zero bound on the nominal interest rate imply that
χ
R∗−1 < 0. This inequality
and the assumption of an active rule, that is A








> 1. But this means
that the mapping (38) becomes explosive. This feature of the mapping in conjunction with the fact that Rt
26is a non-predetermined variable imply that there exists a unique equilibrium that corresponds to the active
steady state.
For 2 note that if σ>1 then from Fact 3 we derive that χ>0. This result and the zero bound
on the nominal interest rate imply that
χ
R∗−1 > 0. This inequality and the assumption that the rules is
active, R∗








< 1. This means that in order for an active forward-










































< 1. Hence the aforementioned mapping becomes non-explosive and the model
displays a multiple equilibria.
As in the contemporaneous interest rate rule analysis, Proposition 9 points out that conditions under
which active forward-looking interest rate rules lead to multiple equilibria in the small open economy depend
on some structural parameters such as the relative risk aversion coeﬃcient σ and the parameters that aﬀect
χ. In particular, for a very low relative risk aversion coeﬃcient (σ<1) an active interest rate rule will
lead to a unique equilibrium regardless of the values of the other structural parameters of the model. On
the other hand, for a very high relative risk aversion coeﬃcient (σ>1), an active interest rate rule may
destabilize the economy depending on the values of some other structural parameters and how they aﬀect χ.
As was mentioned above we are interested in understanding how the equilibrium dynamics of the small open
economy varies with respect to the relative risk aversion coeﬃcient σ, and the degree of openness, α.I nt h i s
s e n s ew ed e ﬁned the function χ(α,σ). To grasp the role that the degree of openness of the economy, α, may
play in the determinacy of equilibrium analysis consider the following extreme cases as a ﬁrst approximation.
Assume that σ>1 and that there is a value for the degree of openness of the economy ˆ α ∈ (0,1) such that







. First, if the economy is
extremely open, that is α → 1, then χ → 0 by Fact 1. Hence by part 2 of Proposition 9 we conclude that
the model displays a unique equilibrium. Second, if the economy is very closed namely α → 0, then by Fact






. But by part 2 of Proposition 9 this means that
the model displays multiple equilibria.
As we did before for the local analysis of contemporaneous, it is possible to derive formally the local
equilibrium frontier, αd(σ), on the plane α vs σ. This frontier divides the aforementioned plane into values
o ft h ed e g r e eo fo p e n n e s s ,α,a n dt h er e l a t i v er i s ka v e r s i o nc o e ﬃcient, σ, under which the model displays
multiple local equilibria or a unique local equilibrium for active forward-looking interest rate rules.






and using Assumption 1 we can
characterize it explicitly in the following proposition.






and let χ(0,σ) be deﬁned as
























































Figure 8: Local equilibrium analysis for an active forward-looking interest rate rule. This ﬁgure shows the
local equilibrium regions. M stands for local multiple equilibria and U stands for a local unique equilibrium.
α corresponds to the degree of openness of the economy and σ denotes the relative risk aversion coeﬃcient.
Moreover lim
σ→σd∗αd(σ)=0and lim
σ→∞αd(σ)=αd∗,w h e r eαd∗ ≡ 1 − Υd
[1−Υd(1−γ)](1−θN) ∈ (0,1).
Proof. See Appendix.
Figure 8 presents the frontier αd(σ). In particular this ﬁgure shows that for σ<σ d∗ the forward-looking
rule guarantees a unique equilibrium. In addition it is possible to observe that for σ>σ d∗,t h em o r eo p e n
the economy is (higher α) the more likely is that an active rule leads to a unique equilibrium. This reinforces
the idea that even in the case of forward-looking rules an active rule might be viewed as stabilizing for some
open economies. However as was pointed out this view may be misleading. As we will show in the global
analysis of the equilibrium, active forward-looking rules may also generate deﬂationary paths and cyclical
and chaotic dynamics.
5.2 Global Dynamics
As was said before the following diﬀerence equation summarizes the dynamics of our model under forward-


















where χ was deﬁn e di n( 3 0 ) .W ew i l ld e ﬁne the left hand-side and the right hand side of equation (39) as
Kf (R) and Jf (R) respectively. In order to study the behavior of function Jf (R) it is useful to deﬁne the
properties of another function deﬁned as αv(σ). The reason is that this function that divides the plane α vs
σ into two regions will deﬁne the values of α and σ for which the function Jf is either strictly decreasing
28or hump-shaped. The function αv(σ) is implicitly deﬁned by χ(α,σ)=1−R∗
A and can be characterized
explicitly in the following Lemma.
Lemma 11 Consider the plane α vs σ, deﬁne Υv ≡ 1−R∗
A < 0 and let χ(0,σ) be deﬁned as in (34),
1. if
(1−γ)












is strictly decreasing and concave for σ<1. Moreover lim
σ→σv∗αv(σ)=0 ,l i m
σ→0
αv(σ)=1 ,a n d lim
σ→1−αv(σ)=










¸ satisfying 0 <σ v∗ < 1.
2. if
(1−γ)
γ < −Υv then αv(σ) never crosses the region α ∈ (0,1) vs σ ∈ (0,∞).
Proof. See the Appendix.
Figure 9 shows the frontier αv(σ) in the plane α vs σ.We can use it and the previous lemma to characterize
the behavior of the function Jf (R).
Lemma 12 Recall the deﬁnitions of αv(σ), σv∗ and Υv in the Lemma 11 and assume
(1−γ)
γ > −Υv.T h e







R1+χ has the following features:











3. For σ ∈ (0,σv∗] and α ≤ αv(σ) the function Jf (R) is strictly decreasing.
Proof. See the Appendix.




has the following features:
1. It is always positive for any R>1;
2. For σ ∈ (0,1),t h ef u n c t i o nKf (R) is strictly decreasing with lim
R→1
Kf (R)=∞ and lim
R→∞
Kf (R)=1 .





Proof. See the Appendix.
As was done for the analysis of contemporaneous rules we can now deﬁne some parametric zones with
respect to α and σ within which equilibrium dynamics will be extensively studied. In order to accomplish
this task it is important to notice the following. From Lemmas 12 and 13 it is clear that for α ∈ (0,1)





and Kf (R) is monotonically decreasing with
respect to R. In addition, from the steady state analysis we know that Jf (R) and Kf (R) meet twice, at
the target interest rate R∗ and at RL <R ∗. On one hand the higher steady state has to occur on the
29decreasing side of the function Jf (R). On the other hand, the lower steady state intersection can occur
above, below or at RJf (namely, on the increasing part, decreasing part or at the peak of Jf (R)). In other

















RL − 1. This implies we have to deﬁne a new frontier or curve αw(σ) that describes





RL − 1. N o t et h a ts i n c ew ea r ef o c u s i n go nt h ec a s e
that σ ∈ (0,1) then by Fact 2 we know that χ(α,σ) < 0 which in turn implies that we are only interested





RL − 1 < 0 is valid.
Using Assumptions 2 we can characterize the frontier αw(σ) in the following Lemma.





RL − 1, Υv ≡ 1−R∗
A and let χ(0,σ) be
deﬁned as in (34). Under Assumption 2 and
(1−γ)












is strictly decreasing and concave for σ<1. Moreover lim
σ→σw∗αw(σ)=0 ,l i m
σ→0
αw(σ)=1 ,a n d lim
σ→1−αw(σ)=










¸ satisfying 0 <σ w∗ <σ v∗ < 1, and σv∗ was deﬁned in Lemma 11.
Figure 9 presents a graphical representation of the αw(σ) frontier. Using this frontier we can study the





.N o t et h a ts i n c eαw(σ) describes all the feasible





RL −1 then we can pursue the following analysis.















A ) ≤ RL.I no t h e rw o r d s
for any σ ≤ σw∗ and any α ≤ αw(σ), we have that the function Kf (R) meets twice the function Jf (R) in
its decreasing part. This particular feature of these functions becomes important to prove that cycles and
chaotic dynamics are not possible.
Moreover from Lemmas 12 and 13 it is possible to see that for α ∈ (0,1) and σ>1, Jf (R) has a





and Kf (R) is monotonically increasing with respect to R. In addition, from the
steady state analysis we know that Jf (R) and Kf (R) meet twice, at the target interest rate R∗ and at
RL <R ∗. The lower steady state, RL occurs on the increasing part of the function Jf (R). But the higher
steady state, R∗ may occur above, below or at RJf (namely, on the decreasing part, increasing part, or at
the peak of Jf (R)). In other words we can have RJf R R∗. The equilibrium dynamics will be aﬀected by















R∗ − 1. This implies we have to deﬁne a new frontier





R∗ −1 or equivalently,






The following lemma characterizes the frontier αk(σ).





and let χ(0,σ) be deﬁned as in (34).
If σ>1 and
(1−γ)(1−θN)






















σ→σk∗αk(σ)=0 ,l i m
σ→∞αk(σ)=αk∗, σk∗ >σ d∗ and αk∗ <α d∗ where αk∗ ≡ 1− Υk
[1−Υk(1−γ)](1−θN) ∈
(0,1); and σd∗ and αd∗ were deﬁned in Proposition 10.
Proof. See Appendix.
A graphical representation of αk(σ) can be found in Figure 9. Using this frontier it is possible to study





. To do so, it is important to observe





then we can pursue the following analysis. Take a pair (σk,α k) such that χ
¡
αk,σk¢






















A ) >R ∗. In other words for any σ ≥ σk∗ > 1 and any α ≤ αk(σ), we have that the function
Kf (R) meets twice the function Jf (R) in its increasing part. But as we will see, this feature leads to the
no possibility of cycles and chaotic dynamics.
This analysis, Lemmas 11, 12, 13, 14, and 15 help us to divide the parametric space α vs σ i n t o5z o n e s : 20
1. Zone 1: σ ∈ (0,σw∗] and α ∈ (0,α w(σ)].K f (R) is strictly decreasing and Jf (R) is either strictly
decreasing or hump-shaped. They meet twice and in the case in which Jf (R) is hump-shaped, they
meet in the decreasing part of Jf (R). T h i sm e a n st h a ti nt h i sc a s eRJf ≤ RL. Standard liquidity
traps (or deﬂationary paths) can be shown to occur as we will see below.
2. Zone 2: σ ∈ (0,1) and α ∈ (αw(σ),1).K f (R) is strictly decreasing and Jf (R) hump-shaped. They
meet twice but in this case RJf >R L. As will be shown cycles and chaotic dynamics around the
passive steady state may occur.
3. Zone 3: σ ∈ (1,σk∗) and α ∈ (0,1).K f (R) is always increasing and Jf (R) is hump-shaped. They
meet twice but in this case RJf <R ∗. As will be shown cycle and chaotic dynamics around the active
steady state may occur.
4. Zone 4: σ>σ k∗ and α ∈ (αk(σ),1). The properties of Kf (R) and Jf (R) are the same as in Zone 3
with RJf = R∗ over αk(σ).
5. Zone 5: σ ≥ σk∗ and α ∈ (0,α k(σ)].K f (R) is always increasing and Jf (R) is hump-shaped. They
meet twice but in this case RJf ≥ R∗. In this zone monotonic inﬂationary paths converging to the
active steady state occur and cycles and chaotic dynamics are not present.
20Although these zones are not marked in Figure 9, this ﬁgure is still useful to understand the deﬁnition of the zones.
31Using these parametric zones and Lemmas 11, 12, 13, 14, and 15 it is possible to prove the existence of
standard liquidity traps, cycles and chaos for forward-looking rules as we did for contemporaneous rules.
We intentionally omit formal proofs on the existence of chaos and cycles for Zone 2, since this case is
isomorphic to what extensively analyzed for the contemporaneous rule case (speciﬁcally what we labelled
Zone 4 and 5 over there). It is hower of interest to consider more formally what occurs for relative risk
aversion above one.









Proof. The proof is trivial and therefore omitted. The reader should simply note that in this case the




Therefore Zone 5 of the forward looking case displays monotonic paths converging to the target steady
state for any initial value between the target and the low steady state. Now we focus on Zones 3 and 4.






















It should be evident that R>R J and that e R>R J too. As pointed out before the forward mapping f is
unimodal with a maximum at RJ. The following assumption will be used throughout the formal analysis.




Proposition 17 Let σ ∈
¡
1,σk∗¢




, i.e. Zone 3 and 4. If
Assumption 3 is satisﬁed, the followings hold:













2 .P e r i o d2c y c l e se x i s t sw i t h i ns u c hs e t .
3. Topological chaotic dynamics, in a Li-Yorke sense are possible.
Proof.
1. The proof is trivial and therefore omitted.























> 0. and g0 ¡
RL¢
< 0 Since the mapping f is continous, a suﬃcient condition
for the existence of period-2 cycles (namely of zeros of the function g)i st h a tg0 (R∗) < 0 as well.
21If fmax = f
¡
RJ¢
> e R there is no non-trivial mapping invariant set. This case gives rise to another type of equilibria of
non cyclical nature. More speciﬁcally, we can deﬁne subset of point within the domain of f that leave such set after a ﬁnite
number of iterations. They would settle on a path converging to the lower bound of the interest rate.
32This is indeed holding if f0 (R∗) < −1, i.e. over regions of the (α,σ) p l a n ew h e r et h em o d e l
displays LOCAL uniqueness (above the frontier αd (σ)). In the region between αd (σ) and αk (σ),
we have that f0 (R∗) ∈ (−1,0) and that suﬃcient condition fails. Instead g(R∗) > 0. We can still
show existence of period-2 cycles around the active steady state R∗ by construction. Let b R ∈ ³
RJ, e R
´








= b R − e R<0. This together
with the pervious information implies the existence of at least other four zeros of g, respectively
t w ot ot h er i g h to fR∗ and the other two to its left.

















R 0 If g
¡
RJ¢





If it is an inequality, we need to make some distinction. Again if we are within a region where
f0 (R∗) < −1, by continuity there exists a point Rl ∈
¡
RL,R ∗¢
such that g(Rl)=0 . Let e R∗be




< 0. Then if g
¡
RJ¢











. In both cases this implies that the second focal point of the period-2 cycle,




If instead we lie between αd (σ) and αk (σ) and we have that f0 (R∗) ∈ (−1,0), period-2 cycles
occur surely if g
¡
RJ¢
> 0. In this case since g(R∗) > 0, two zeros of g occur to the right of R∗,one






















> 0. and h0 ¡
RL¢
< 0 We show
that the Li-Yorke suﬃcient condition for the existence of topological chaos is satisﬁed. Moreover
h0 (R∗) > 0 always. But this is suﬃcient to show the existence of a period-3 cycle since there
must be a point between RJ and R∗ such that h(R)=0 . By Sarkovskii’sTheorem cycles of any
periodicity exist. The Li-Yorke condition applies too. Let b R ∈
¡
RL,R J¢
be the pre-image of RJ.












with RL < b R<R L < R. Such
condition holds.
(b) It should be clear that h
¡
RL¢
= h(R∗)=0 ,h 0 (R∗) > 0 and h0 ¡
RL¢




Similarly to the analogous case for the contemporaneous rule, those conditions are enough for the




The following ﬁgure summarizes the main results of the global analysis. Afterward we will use this ﬁgure
to compare the results from the forward-looking rules analysis with the results from the contemporaneous
rules analysis presented in Figure 6.
Figure 9 shows that forward looking rules alter the ﬂavour of our previous conclusions for contemporane-
ous rules. Although as before interest rate rules that target the expected future CPI-inﬂation can be highly
destabilizing, there are some important diﬀerences with respect to the case of contemporaneous interest rate
rules. It is still valid that the degree of openness of the economy matters for the appearance of cycles and
chaotic dynamics. However under forward-looking rules these types of endogenous ﬂuctuations may appear
33 
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Figure 9: Equilibrium analysis for an active forward-looking interest rate rule. This ﬁgure shows the results
from the global equilibrium analysis and a comparison between the local equilibrium analysis and the global
equilibrium analysis. M stands for local multiple equilibria and U stands for a local unique equilibrium. α
corresponds to the degree of openness of the economy and σ denotes the relative risk aversion coeﬃcient.
even for economies with relative risk aversion coeﬃcients smaller than one. In this case, given the relative
risk aversion coeﬃcient, the more open the economy is the more likely is that a forward-looking rule will
lead the economy to cyclical and chaotic dynamics around the passive steady state.
Furthermore, in contrast to the results for contemporaneous rules, the degree of openness of the economy
plays an opposite role for economies that follow a forward-looking rule and have a relative risk aversion
coeﬃcient greater that one. In other words, given a relative risk aversion coeﬃcient bigger than one, the
more open the economy is the more likely is that a forward-looking rule will drive the economy to cyclical
and chaotic dynamics around the active steady state.
As was mentioned above, following the arguments and proofs developed for contemporaneous interest
rate rules, it is possible to state proofs of the existence of two-period cycles and chaotic dynamics under
forward-looking rules. In stead of doing this analysis we will use the aforementioned parametrization and
present the following orbit diagrams for σ = {0.8,2}.
Figures 10 and 11 show how depending on the degree of openness of the economy, an active forward-
looking rule may drive the economy into period-2 cycles, period-4 cycles, period-8 cycles and even chaotic
dynamics. Both Figures show that as the degree of openness of the economy, α, increases from zero, the rule
drives the economy into a period-2 cycle, as indicated by the ﬁrst split into two branches. As the economy
becomes more open both branches split simultaneously yielding a period-4 cycle. A cascade of further period
doublings occurs as the degree of openness of the economy increases, yielding period-8, period-16 and so on.
Finally after some degree of openness the rule drives the economy into a chaotic dynamics, that is when the
map (31) becomes chaotic and the attractor changes from a ﬁnite to an inﬁnite set of point.
34Figure 10: Orbit diagram for an active forward-looking rule and σ =2 .R t denotes the nominal interest rate
and σ stands for the relative risk aversion coeﬃcient.
Figure 11: Orbit diagram for an active forward-looking rule and σ =0 .8.Rt denotes the nominal interest
rate and σ stands for the relative risk aversion coeﬃcient.
35In general terms the Figures suggest that the more open the economy is, the more likely is that the rule
will cause chaotic dynamics. However it is important to observe that the relative risk aversion coeﬃcient also
plays a role in the analysis. As we found before, for relative risk aversion coeﬃcients greater than one, σ>1,
(that is when consumption and real money balances are substitutes), the cyclical and chaotic dynamics may
occur around the active steady state as shown in Figure 10. On the other hand, for relative risk aversion
coeﬃcients smaller than one, σ<1, (that is when consumption and real money balances are complements),
the cyclical and chaotic dynamics may be present around the passive steady state as shown in Figure 11.
To conclude the global equilibrium analysis it is important to point out how the results presented in
this analysis may be aﬀected by relaxing the assumption that
(1−γ)











RL then the results are not aﬀected. However if it is
assumed that
(1−γ)
γ < −Υw < −Υv, then the degree of openness plays no role in the analysis for σ<1.I n
other words, regardless of the degree of openness, the model displays chaotic and cyclical dynamics around
the passive steady state for relative risk aversion coeﬃcients smaller than one. However if the relative risk
aversion coeﬃcient is greater than one, it is still valid that the more open the economy is the more likely
is that an active forward-looking rule will drive the economy to chaotic and cyclical dynamics around the
active steady state.
5.3 Local Uniqueness vs. Global Multiplicity
As we have done for the contemporaneous case, we compare the local and global results for forward-looking
rules. A graphical comparison is presented in Figure 9. Once more by studying dynamics in a small
neighborhood of the active steady state we would conclude that active rules deliver stability in equilibrium
for any level of openness, as long as the risk aversion coeﬃcient stays below an upper threshold σd∗.F o r
higher risk aversion coeﬃcients a unique equilibrium still occurs as long as the economy is open enough.
The conclusions from the global analysis are radically diﬀerent. In particular for very open economies
with relative risk aversion coeﬃcients greater than one active forward-looking rules may lead the economy
to cyclical and chaotic dynamics around the active steady state. In addition for economies with relative risk
aversion coeﬃcients smaller than one, the aforementioned rules may drive the economy not only to liquidity
traps (deﬂationary paths) but also to chaotic and cyclical dynamics around the passive steady state. In both
cases the existence of this chaotic and cyclical dynamics are associated with the degree of openness of the
economy.
6 A Sensitivity and a Quantitative Analysis
In this section, we use the parametrization of Table 2 to pursue two exercises for contemporaneous and
forward-looking rules. The ﬁrst one is to assess the size of the local and global uniqueness/multiplicity
regions shown in Figures 6 and 9. The second one consists of studying how these regions vary accordingly
to changes in parameters such as the share of expenditure of real money balances, 1−γ,t h ei n ﬂation target
π∗, and the degree of active responsiveness to the CPI-inﬂation of the rule, A
R∗. As before we will do the
analysis using the plane α vs σ considering feasible values for these parameters.
First we pursue the analysis for active contemporaneous rules. The results are presented in Figure 12. For
36the following analysis it is useful to use this Figure and Figure 6. In Figure 12 the top-left panel represents
t h eb a s ec a s et h a ts e t s1 − γ =0 .03, π∗ =1 .008, and A
R∗ =2 .24. From this panel it is clear that given
typical values used in the RBC literature σ ∈ (1,3) and depending on the degree of openness the economy,
the active contemporaneous rule may drive the economy to cycles and chaos around both the active and the
passive steady states and to liquidity traps.
The top-right panel draws the frontiers that determine the local and global multiple equilibria regions,
after a change in the share of expenditure of real money balances, 1 − γ. It shows that a reduction in this
share shifts all the frontiers down increasing the area of possible liquidity traps and reducing no only the
areas of cyclical and chaotic dynamics but also the areas of local multiple equilibria. In this sense economies
that are “less cash dependent” (lower 1−γ) are less likely to be driven to local and global multiple equilibria
(cycles or chaos) by an active contemporaneous interest rate rule.
The eﬀects on the frontiers from increasing the inﬂation target are shown in the bottom-left panel of
Figure 12. From this panel we can conclude that increasing the inﬂation target will also shift down the
frontiers. This implies that local and global multiple equilibria become less likely.
Finally the bottom-right panel represents the case of a reducing the degree of responsiveness of the rule
with respect to the CPI-inﬂation. In this case we assume that the interest rate response coeﬃcient to the
CPI-inﬂation corresponds to the one in the well studied Taylor rule A
R∗ =1 .5. The reduction in the level of
aggressiveness of the rule with respect of inﬂation causes a shift down of all the frontiers meaning that the
local and global multiple equilibria become less feasible. In other words, a more aggressive central bank with
respect to the CPI-inﬂation is more likely to lead the economy to cycles and chaos than a less aggressive
one.
In Figure 13 we show the results for forward-looking rules of the same two exercises we did for the
contemporaneous rules. Using this Figure and Figure 10. We can pursue the following analysis. The base
case is presented in the top-left panel setting 1 − γ =0 .03, π∗ =1 .008, and A
R∗ =2 .24. It is clear that for
σ ∈ (1,2) an active forward-looking rule assures a local unique equilibrium but depending on the degree of
openness it also may drive the economy to cycles or chaos around the inﬂation target. Furthermore for the
type of rules under analysis and for σ<1, cyclical and chaotic dynamics around the passive steady state
may appear depending on the degree of openness.
The top-right panel shows the eﬀects on the frontiers that determine the local and global multiple
equilibria regions, caused by a change in the share of expenditure of real money balances, 1−γ. In contrast
to the results for contemporaneous rules we ﬁnd that “less cash dependent economies” (lower 1−γ) are more
are more likely to be driven to cyclical and chaotic dynamics around the active or the passive steady state
by forward-looking rules.
The bottom-left panel of Figure 13 presents the results of an increase in the inﬂation target. This increase
shifts down the frontiers implying that possible cycles, chaos and local multiple equilibria for forward-looking
rules become more likely under active forward-looking rules.
Finally the bottom-right panel represents the case of a reducing the degree of responsiveness of the rule
with respect to the CPI-inﬂation to A
R∗ =1 .5 (the Taylor rule). Although in principle the reduction of the
degree of aggressiveness of the rule does not aﬀect the frontiers for σ<1, it can be observed that it causes a
shift up of all the frontiers for σ>1. This means that local multiple equilibria become more feasible whereas
37Figure 12: This ﬁgure shows how the local and global equilibrium frontiers for active contemporaneous rules
vary with changes of the share of expenditures on real money balances, 1−γ,t h et a r g e ti n ﬂation, π∗,a n dt h e
degree of responsiveness of the rule, A
R∗. The base case corresponds to the left-top panel. See also Figure 7.
α corresponds to the degree of openness of the economy and σ denotes the relative risk aversion coeﬃcient.
Figure 13: This ﬁgure shows how the local and global equilibrium frontiers for active forward-looking rules
vary with changes of the share of expenditures on real money balances, 1−γ,t h et a r g e ti n ﬂation, π∗,a n dt h e
degree of responsiveness of the rule, A
R∗. The base case corresponds to the left-top panel. See also Figure 10.
α corresponds to the degree of openness of the economy and σ denotes the relative risk aversion coeﬃcient.
38global multiple equilibria (cycles and chaos around the inﬂation target) become less possible. In other words
and in contrast to the contemporaneous rules results we have the following result. Although it is less likely
that a more aggressive forward-looking rule with respect to the CPI-inﬂation will lead the economy to local
multiple equilibria, it also more likely that the same rule will drive the same economy to cycles and chaos
around the inﬂation target.
7 Avoiding Cyclical and Chaotic Equilibria:
In this section, we show how the existence of cyclical and chaotic equilibria around either the active or the
passive steady state depends on the importance of real money balances for welfare. Other things being equal
the equilibrium level of real balances is clearly increasing in the parameter γ. We consider separately the
case of contemporaneous and forward looking rules.
7.1 Contemporaneous Inﬂation Rule
Throughout the paper we assumed that κ
 (0) > 1





. This was necessary and suﬃcient for
the possibility of parametric regions of, respectively, local indeterminacy and local determinacy (but global
multiplicity) with respect to openness and risk aversion coeﬃcients. Given the monetary policy related
parameters (R∗ and A), we study how the left hand side of the inequality above depends on γ.
Deﬁne the function δ(γ)= κ
 (0). Clearly δ
0(γ) < 0, δ(0) = 1 − θN and δ(1) = 0.I f (1 − θN) >
1





,t h e nδ(γ) crosses the lines 1






A and RL −1 at positive values of
γ, that we denote, respectively by γc, γ∗ and e γ.






A ), δ(γ) > 1





and all dynamics described in the contemporaneous rules section above are possible. However if γ ∈







, δ(γ) ∈ (R
∗−1
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and the model always delivers




1−θN−(1−θN)(RL−1), δ(γ) ∈ (RL − 1, R∗−1
A ) and the model can not display cycles/chaos around the
active steady state but only around the passive one. Finally for γ>e γ, δ(γ) <R L − 1 and the forward
dynamics mapping is monotonic between the two steady states. This rules out any possible cycle or chaotic
behavior around both steady states. In this case multiple global equilibria are possible but take the form of
monotonic deﬂationary paths (or standard liquidity traps) only.
From this technical observation we can conclude that erratic equilibrium dynamics of the form described
extensively in the paper become less likely as the role of real money balances in transactions vanishes.
Economies in which cash is greatly valued for transaction purposes (low γ) seem more vulnerable to the
endogenous volatility described in this study. On the contrary, as the credit market improves and cash
becomes less and less needed, such endogenous ﬂuctuations disappear and the only risky equilibrium becomes
a liquidity trap (the short interest rate falls progressively towards zero). It would be interesting then to
compare the aggregate performance of developed and emerging economies following some kind of implicit
CPI inﬂation targeting as deﬁned here. We are currently pursuing this.
Apart from allowing us to distinguish between economies with diﬀerent levels of ﬁnancial innovation,
these latest results on γ highlight some role for monetary policy to eliminate or at least reduce unwanted
39multiplicity. In fact for a given importance of real balances (i.e. given γ), the central bank could design an
active interest rate rule that could both deliver local uniqueness and eliminate cyclical/chaotic equilibria.
The following proposition deﬁnes the necessary conditions.
Proposition 18 Take a given γ ∈ (0,1).I ft h ei n ﬂation target π∗ >β (1 + δ(γ)) -w i t hδ(γ) deﬁned above
- and the interest rate reaction to current CPI inﬂa t i o ni sb i g g e rt h a no n eb u ts m a l l e rt h a na nu p p e r - b o u n d
ρ (deﬁned below), then no cyclical/chaotic equilibria can occur for contemporaneous active Taylor rules.
Proof. Since we want RL − 1 >δ (γ), we need R∗ > 1+δ(γ), i.e. if a second steady state exists it has
to be lower than the target. A second condition has to do with the steepness of the rule around the target
itself. If the elasticity is exactly one, we have two coincident steady states and no dynamics occur. However
the stationary equilibrium is hyperbolic and local analysis is meaningless. By continuity, as we increase
the elasticity slightly above one a second steady state arises but not that far from the target. A suﬃcient
condition for RL to occur to the right of 1+δ(γ) is that R∗ (δ(γ)))
R∗−1
A < (1 + δ(γ))(R∗ − 1)
R∗−1
A .T a k i n g




ln(R∗ − 1) − lnδ(γ)
lnR∗ − ln(1 + δ(γ))
(40)
This poses an upper bound to the level of inﬂation aggressiveness consistent with local determinacy and no
equilibrium cycles/chaos
Though the result might have been quite intuitive since the beginning, we have stated formally the
importance of choosing the target inﬂation rate, in addition to the level of aggressiveness, in order to make
endogenous ﬂuctuations less likely. And this has can be accomplished without requiring any speciﬁc Ricardian
or non-Ricardian ﬁscal policy rule. The latter channel might still play a role in eliminating deﬂationary paths
too. This is the purpose of a research project we are currently dealing with.
7.2 Forward-Looking Inﬂation Rule
For a forward looking rule we have shown that the degree of openness plays a role on for a coeﬃcient of
relative risk aversion below one. There, we identiﬁed an openness frontier distinguishing between standard
liquidity traps and cycles/chaos around the passive steady state. For risk aversion above one, the only role
of openness regards the local equilibrium determinacy. At a global level cycles around the active steady state
are always possible.
A necessary and suﬃcient condition for the existence of an α-frontier dividing liquidity traps from cycles
was
(1−γ)




γ . The following are clearly true:δ






> 0,t h e r ee x i s t saγc ∈ (0,1) such that δ(γc)=−Υw. It follows that for
γ ∈ [γc,1), δ(γ) ≤− Υw the frontier αw is not deﬁned. This implies that standard liquidity traps, though
still possible, become a "measure zero event", since the economy would display a monotonically decaying
series of interest rates only for a peculiar initial condition. For values below such critical point, the frontier
is well deﬁned and liquidity traps become the unique type of self-fulﬁlling equilibrium for levels of openness.
40The policy implication is not as clear as what obtained in the contemporaneous case. Under a forward
looking rule more volatile dynamics occur when real balances are less valued for welfare. They can still occur
even for more cash-dependent economies but together with deﬂationary paths.
Is there any role then for monetary policy to at least get rid of cyclical patterns, as we found for the
contemporaneous case? An intuitive policy prescription could be the following. Take a small open economy,
characterized by a triplet (σ,α,γ),f o rσ<1. The monetary authority could design a monetary rule
appropriately (by accurately choosing R∗ and A,s u c ht h a tχ(σ,α,γ)) < Υw. This would bring the economy
out of the cyclical pattern region, though still allowing liquidity traps.22
Now we move fto σ>1. Here cycles disappear if χ(α,σ,γ) > Υk. This would occur for any level of





=0 . But this is never true in our model since we consider speciﬁcally
R∗ > 1 and A>R ∗. Nevertheless, Υk is aﬀe c t e db yt h ec h o i c eo ft h ei n ﬂation target π∗ and the interest rate
rule responsiveness ρ = A





. Then, given a triplet (α,σ,γ),














8 Backward-Looking Rules and Targeting The Non-Traded Good
Inﬂation
8.1 Backward-Looking Rule
We have shown that contemporaneous and forward-looking rules may lead to cyclical and chaotic dynamics
and more importantly that these dynamics are related to the degree of openness of the economy and to the
relative risk aversion coeﬃcient. The next step is to study the dynamics of the small open economy model
under an active backward-looking rule. In this case the rule is deﬁned as:







R∗ > 1 (41)













These last two equations form a system of two ﬁrst-order diﬀerence equations. As is well known to derive
analytic results, as before, from the non-linear study of this system is a very diﬃcult task. Therefore we
rely on simulations trying to ﬁnd if for diﬀerent values of α and σ the system presents cycles or chaos. The
results that are available upon request show that these types of dynamics are not present under backward-
looking rules. In other words, the model always converges to either the active steady state or to the passive
steady-state.
22Cycles and chaos around the passive steady state are ruled out for any level of openness if the threshold Υw is bigger than
zero. It can be shown that this can be achieved by choosing R∗ and A accordingly.
418.2 Targeting the Non-Traded Goods Inﬂation Rate
It is possible to pursue all the previous analysis for contemporaneous and forward-looking rules changing
the target of the rule from the CPI-inﬂation to the Non-traded goods inﬂation. If the government targets
the non-traded goods inﬂation rate, the analyses for contemporaneous and forward-looking rules correspond
to study the equations (29) and (31), as before, but replacing the exponent χ by χ0, where χ0 is deﬁned as
χ0 ≡
χ
1−α. In fact, under some assumptions, it is possible to derive similar lemmas and propositions to the
ones derived before.23 Due to space constraint, we prefer to use the parametrization of Table 2 and draw the
frontiers that determine the local and global equilibria regions in the plane α vs σ for the aforementioned
rules. Figure 14 presents the results. In this ﬁgure we have abused of notation using the same names
αT(σ),α p(σ) and αI(σ),a n dαw(σ),α d(σ) and αk(σ) for the frontiers as we used before. 24 We keep the
same notation to facilitate comparisons. The top panel of this ﬁgure shows the local and global multiple
equilibria regions for the contemporaneous rule. To some extent it seems that given the relative risk aversion
coeﬃcient (for instance σ =2 .1), the degree of openness diﬀerentiates between the possibility of cycles and
chaos around the passive steady state and the possibility of the same type of dynamics around the active
steady state. It is also clear that for speciﬁc relative risk aversion coeﬃcients, standard liquidity traps may
arise for any degree of openness of the economy.
The bottom panel presents the results for the forward-looking rule. It is possible to observe that in this
case the degree of openness of the economy is not as important as the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion
coeﬃcient in determining the possible dynamics of the model. In fact we can pursue a closer analysis of this
case and construct an orbit diagram varying the relative risk aversion coeﬃcient.
Figure 15 presents the results. The top panel corresponds to the case of an almost closed economy
(α =0 .01), while the bottom panel corresponds to an open economy (α =0 .50). For low relative risk
aversion coeﬃcients (σ<1) the rule drives the economy into standard liquidity traps and as the coeﬃcient
increases cycles and chaos around the passive steady state appear. For high relative risk aversion coeﬃcients
(σ>1)t h es t o r yi sd i ﬀerent. The economy is driven into chaotic dynamics around the active steady state
and as the coeﬃcient increases cycles and monotonic inﬂationary paths converging to the active steady-state
appear.25 As can be observed the role of the degree of openness of the economy in the analysis is not as
important as the role played by the relative risk aversion coeﬃcient. In fact varying the degree of openness
of the economy from 0.01 to 0.50 does not aﬀect signiﬁcantly the dynamics around the passive steady state
but it has an eﬀect on the dynamics around the active steady state, as predicted by Figure 13. For instance
for σ =1 .5, the forward-looking rule drives an almost closed economy (α =0 .01) to a monotonic inﬂationary
path converging to the active steady state, while the same rule drives the open economy (α =0 .50)i n t oa
period-two cycle around the active steady state.
23T h e ya r ea v a i l a b l ef r o mt h ea u t h o r su p o nr e q u e s t .
24The functional forms of these frontiers are diﬀerent from the ones in the CPI-inﬂation targeting analysis.
25The reader may ask for the white window between the chaotic region around the passive steady state and the chaotic region
around the active steady state. In that window there are paths of the nominal interest rate (Rt) going to either 1 or ∞. Both
dynamics are discarded in our analysis since we are interested exclusively in paths that satisfy 1 <R t ≤∞ .
42Figure 14: Targeting the non-traded goods inﬂation. Equilibrium analysis for an active contemporaneous rule
(top panel) and an active forward-looking rule (bottom panel). This ﬁgure shows the results from the global
equilibrium analysis and a comparison between the local equilibrium analysis and the global equilibrium
analysis. α corresponds to the degree of openness of the economy and σ denotes the relative risk aversion
coeﬃcient.
Figure 15: Targeting the non-traded goods inﬂation. Orbit diagrams for an active forward-looking rule.The
top panel corresponds to the case of an almost closed economy (α =0 .01), while the bottom panel corresponds
to an open economy (α =0 .50). Rt denotes the nominal interest rate and σ stands for the relative risk
aversion coeﬃcient.
439C o n c l u s i o n s
In this paper we have shown that Taylor rules that are active "in the Taylor sense" around the target
steady state might actually have perverse eﬀects on a small open economy dynamics. In particular we
have shown that there is an interesting interaction between the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion and the
degree of openness (measured by the share of tradable goods in consumers’ preferences) in characterizing the
economic dynamics of our small open economy. To further stress the relevance of our results, we have been
pursuing both a local and a global equilibrium dynamics analysis (the former being the standard approach
in the monetary rules literature).
In the contemporaneous Taylor rule case, for risk aversion and openness ranges for which local analysis
would conclude in favor of price stability, we highlight the possibility of standard liquidity traps, cycli-
cal/chaotic dynamics both around a desired (targeted) and an undesired (passive) steady steady. In partic-
ular, for high enough risk aversion, all these possibilities can arise according to the degree of openness of the
economy. More closed economies can display high instability but still around the target. As the share of
traded goods increases (the economy opens up, and so the weight of traded goods in CPI inﬂation increases),
the likelihood of falling (monotonically or cyclically) into dangerous deﬂations does too. An extremely open
economy seems to fall into such traps with probability one.
Forward looking Taylor rules do not seem to do a much better job. For local determinacy ranges of risk
aversion and openness, we can get liquidity traps, cyclical and chaotic equilibria as for the contemporaneous
case. All our analytical results are conﬁrmed by a simple parametrization of the model.
Though from a local point of view contemporaneous or forward looking inﬂation targeting give basically
identical results, from a global point of view there are few interesting diﬀerences. First, while for moderate
risk aversions (below 1) contemporaneous rules can deliver monotonic deﬂationary paths only, forward looking
rules could also produce cycles and chaotic dynamics around the low inﬂation state. Second, for risk aversion
above one, liquidity traps are only possible with contemporaneous rules but not with forward looking. The
latter can still create endogenous ﬂuctuations but around the target state only. Furthermore, forward looking
rules also display monotonic equilibrium paths converging to the active steady state. For what concerns local
stability, they behave quite similarly. Nevertheless, the size of the local indeterminacy region is generally
smaller for the contermporaneous rule case.
For the contermporaneous rule case, we found out that erratic equilibrium dynamics of the form described
extensively in the paper become less likely as the role of real money balances in transactions vanishes.
Economies in which cash is greatly valued for transaction purposes (low γ) seem more vulnerable to the
endogenous volatility described in this study. On the contrary, as the credit market improves and cash
becomes less and less needed, such endogenous ﬂuctuations disappear and the only risky equilibrium becomes
a liquidity trap (the short interest rate falls progressively towards zero). In such circumstances there is still
an active role for monetary policy in eliminating at least part of the multiplicity. We showed that if the
target inﬂa t i o nr a t ea n dt h ei n t e r e s tr a t er u l er e s p o n s et oi n ﬂation are chosen appropriately (accurately
monitoring the level of, exogenous, ﬁnancial innovation), cycles and chaos can be completely eliminated,
without requiring any speciﬁc Ricardian or non-Ricardian ﬁscal policy rule. The latter channel might still
play a role in eliminating deﬂationary paths too. This is going to be part of our for future research.
The relationship between cash dependency and multiplicity is more mixed in the case of forward looking
44rules. A decrease in the role of money in providing transaction services does not eliminate unwanted cyclical
paths and chaos. Actually it seems to be the case that for less cash dependent econmies cyclical patterns
are the most likely outcome.
A result of some interest is that the exixtence of endogenous cycles and chaos does not depend on targeting
aC P Ii n ﬂation rate, or, in other words, considering traded goods prices in the price index. The degree of
openness still plays a role even though the interest rate reacts to non-traded goods inﬂation only (domestic
inﬂaition). To conclude we consider rules that react to past inﬂation (backward looking rules) and ﬁnd out
that cyclical and chaotic dynamics are not possible, although the econmy can still display multiple equilibria
in the form of liquidity traps or monotonic paths to the target.
The bottom line though is that price stability could be indeed a diﬃcult task. From a technical point of
view this paper points out the misleading results one would get by focusing on local techniques in judging
the stabilizing properties of monetary rules. From a policy point of view it might highlight some warnings
for small open economies fastly moving to inﬂation targeting regime through interest rate feedback rules.
Central bank of developing and developed small open economies are explicitly making price stability their
prime objective and therefore pursuing aggressive anti-inﬂationary policies.
AA p p e n d i x
A.1 Steady state multiplicity
At the steady state Rt+1 = Rt = ¯ R. Equation (29) reduces to
(R∗ − 1)
R∗−1
A ¯ R = R∗ ¡ ¯ R − 1
¢ R∗−1
A (43)
It is clear that ¯ R = R∗ is a possible steady state. We are going to show that if the Taylor rule is active at
this steady state a second lower steady state RL <R ∗ exists and it is unique.
Proposition 19 If A
R∗ > 1 (an active Taylor rule) then there exists a unique RL ∈ (1,R ∗) that solves (43).
Proof. First of all denote the left hand side and the right hand side of equation (43) as LHS( ¯ R) and
RHS( ¯ R) respectively. Second note that
lim
¯ R→1






LHS( ¯ R) is linear in ¯ R with slope (R∗ − 1)
R∗−1
A > 0.R H S ( ¯ R) slopes upwards as well for any ¯ R>1,
∂RHS( ¯ R)
∂ ¯ R
= R∗R∗ − 1
A
¡ ¯ R − 1
¢ R∗−1
A −1 > 0
As u ﬃcient condition for a second solution ¯ R = RL to exist is that the slope of the RHS( ¯ R) at R∗ be smaller
than (R∗ − 1)
R∗−1
A . This will guarantee that the LHS( ¯ R) and RHS( ¯ R) will cross at a second point ¯ R = RL
45between 1 and R∗. The slope of the RHS( ¯ R) at R∗ is R∗
A (R∗ − 1)
R∗−1
A . Hence the suﬃcient condition is
R∗
A < 1 or equivalently A
R∗ > 1.
Next we show that the second lower steady state is unique. For that it is enough to show that the
RHS( ¯ R) is strictly concave. Taking second derivative:
RHS
00
( ¯ R)=R∗R∗ − 1
A








which is strictly negative as long as R∗−1
A − 2 < 0. But this is guaranteed by the fact that A
R∗ > 1.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. The explicit expression for αI(σ) comes directly from its implicit deﬁnition χ(α,σ)=ΥI and some
algebra. αI(σ) is well deﬁned in the sense that for feasible values of the structural parameters and for
any σ ≥ σI∗ > 1 it is a continuous function with αI(σ) ∈ (0,1). To see this, note that since ΥI > 0,γ ,
θN ∈ (0,1) and σ>1 then it is straightforward to derive that αI(σ) < 1. Furthermore it is simple to see that








comes from solving χ(0,σI∗)=ΥI.U s i n g
Assumption 1 we may infer that σI∗ > 1. Utilizing this and Fact 4 we can deduce that for any σ ≥ σI∗ > 1,
it is valid that χ(0,σ) >χ (0,σI∗)=ΥI, w h i c hi nt u r nm e a n st h a t1 > ΥI
χ(0,σ). But this last inequality and
ΥI > 0,γ ,θ N ∈ (0,1) and σ>1 imply that αI(σ) > 0.
























< 0 for ΥI > 0,γ ,θ N ∈ (0,1) and σ>1. Therefore the function
αI(σ) is strictly increasing and concave for any σ ≥ σI∗ > 1. Additionally from the deﬁnition of αI(σ)
it is straightforward to show that lim
σ→σI∗αI(σ)=0and lim
σ→∞αI(σ)=1− ΥI
[1−ΥI(1−γ)](1−θN) ∈ (0,1) since
αI(σ) ∈ (0,1) for any σ ≥ σI∗.
A.3 Proof of Lemma 3
Proof. First compute the derivative of the function J(R) in (37) with respect to R
J0 (R)=
R∗Rχ (R − 1)
χ−1
(R1+χ)
2 (1 + χ − R)
For any R>1,s i g n[J0 (R)] = sign(1 + χ − R).
1. if σ ∈ (0,1),χ<0 for any α because of Fact 2. Therefore 1 − R + χ<0 for any R>1. The limits
are trivial.
2. if σ>1,χ>0 for any α from Fact 3. We have that J0 (R)=0if and only if R = RJ =1+χ>1.
J (R) is increasing for any R<R Jand decreasing for R>R J. The limits are trivial.
46A.4 Proof of Lemma 4
Proof. The proof procceds following the same steps that we followed in the proof for Proposition 2. The






we use Υp ≡ R∗−1
A . Moreover use the fact
that ΥI > Υp. Finally the inequalities αp∗ >α I∗ and σp∗ <σ I∗ follow from ΥI > Υp and the deﬁnitions of
αp∗,α I∗,σ p∗ and σI∗ (see Proposition 2).
A.5 Proof of Lemma 5




















1. If σ ∈ (0,1),χ<0 for any α ∈ (0,1) because of Fact 2. Therefore for R∗ > 1 we have that
R1−R
∗
A + χ<0 for any R>1. But this implies that K0 (R) < 0. Moreover since 1−R
∗
A + χ<0, for





2. Now consider σ>1. We know from of Fact 3 that this is enough to have χ(α,σ) > 0. Therefore
K0 (R)=0if and only if R = RK =
χA
R∗−1. However we need RK to be bigger than 1 to be a valid
peak. This requires χ(α,σ) > R∗−1
A . Is this true for any σ>1 and for any α ∈ (0,1)? The answer is
no and this is why there are two cases: (a) and (b).
(a) Note that αp(σ) is deﬁned implicitly as the values of α and σ such that χ(α,σ)=R∗−1
A and σp∗
is such that χ(0,σp∗)=R∗−1
A . For any σ ∈ (1,σp∗) and α ∈ (0,1) we have that χ(α,σ) < R∗−1
A .
The reason is that from Facts 4 and 5,g i v e nα ∈ (0,1) and for any σ ∈ (1,σp∗) we have that
χ(α,σ) <χ(α,σp∗) <χ(0,σp∗)=R∗−1
A . Hence χ(α,σ) < R∗−1
A , which in turn means that RK
< 1 .H o w e v e rw eh a v ea s s u m e dt h a tR>1. Therefore it is clear that we are only interested in
the decreasing part of K (R) and the ﬁr s tp a r to fp a r t( a )f o l l o w s .
Furthermore for any σ ∈ [σp∗,∞) such that α ≥ αp(σ),K(R) is strictly decreasing. The reason is
that by deﬁnition αp(σ) is deﬁned implicitly as the values of α and σ such that χ(α,σ)=R∗−1
A .
Then using Facts 5 it is clear that for any σ ∈ [σp∗,∞) and any α ≥ αp(σ), we have that
χ(α,σ) ≤ χ(αp(σ),σ)=R∗−1
A . But this means that RK ≤ 1. However we have assumed that
R>1. Therefore it is clear that we are only interested in the decreasing part of K (R) and the
second part of part (a) follows.
(b) Since αp(σ) is deﬁned implicitly as the values of α and σ such that χ(α,σ)=R∗−1
A , then using
Facts 5 it is clear that for any σ ∈ (σp∗,∞) and any α<α p(σ) we have that χ(α,σ) >
χ(αp(σ),σ)=R∗−1
A . But this means that RK =
χA
R∗−1 > 1 is a valid peak of K (R). Hence K (R)
is hump-shaped with a peak at RK =
χA
R∗−1 > 1.
47A.6 Proof of Lemma 6
Proof. The proof procceds following the same steps that we follow in the proof for Proposition 2. The only






we use ΥT ≡ RL − 1. Moreover use the fact
that ΥI > ΥT. For the last part of the Lemma remember that since Υp ≡ R∗−1
A then Assumption 2 can
be rewritten as Υp > ΥT. Then utilizing this and the deﬁnitions of αp∗,α T∗,σ p∗ and σT∗ the inequalities
αT∗ >α p∗ and σT∗ <σ p∗ follow (see Lemma 4).
A.7 Proof of Proposition 10
Proof. The proof follows the same steps that we apply in the proof for Proposition (2). The only diﬀerence












. Moreover use the fact
that ΥI > Υd.
A.8 Proof of Lemma 11
Proof. The explicit expression for αv(σ) comes directly from its implicit deﬁnition χ(α,σ)=Υv < 0 and
some algebra.
1. First note that using Υv < 0,γ ,θ N ∈ (0,1), and the assumption
(1−γ)
γ > −Υv we can infer that
























< 0, which means that αv(σ) is strictly decreasing and concave
for any σ<1. The limits are trivial using Fact 1,a n dt h ed e ﬁnition of αv(σ) and σv∗. In particular note
that the expression for σv∗ comes from solving χ(0,σv∗)=Υv,a n dt h a t0 <σ v∗ < 1 if
(1−γ)
γ > −Υv.
The reader may ask why we focus on values of σ such that σ<1. The reason is that for σ>1,t h e
function αv(σ) / ∈ (0,1). To see this note that from the deﬁnition of αv(σ), Fact 3 and the assumptions
Υv < 0,γ ,θ N ∈ (0,1), and
(1−γ)
γ > −Υv, we may conclude that αv(σ) > 1 for any σ>1 with
lim
σ→1+αv(σ)=+ ∞.
2. First note that it is easy to check that if
(1−γ)
γ < −Υv then lim
σ→1−αv(σ)=+ ∞ and lim
σ→1+αv(σ)=−∞.







∂σ2 , Fact 2, Υv < 0,
γ, θN ∈ (0,1) and
(1−γ)
γ < −Υv we can derive that
∂αv(σ)
∂σ > 0 and
∂2αv(σ)
∂σ2 > 0 for any σ<1.




σ→1−αv(σ)=+ ∞, then we can conclude that for any 0 ≤ σ ≤ 1 we have that
αv(σ) > 1.
Moreover from the deﬁnition of αv(σ), Fact 3, Υv < 0,γ ,θ N ∈ (0,1) and
(1−γ)
γ > −Υv we can observe
that for any σ>1 we have that αv(σ) < 0. Hence if
(1−γ)
γ < −Υv then αv(σ) never crosses the region
α ∈ (0,1) vs σ ∈ (0,∞).
48A.9 Proof of Lemma 12
Proof.
1. Trivial.


















































<R .We will assume 1 > −χ and relax this
assumption in part 3 of this proof. If there is a peak at R = RJf, in order for it to be a valid peak we
need that RJf > 1. In other words we need that χ>1−R∗
A . It is important to remember that 1 <R ∗
and therefore 1−R∗
A < 0. If σ>1 then Fact 3 guarantees that 1 > −χ and since χ>0 then we have
a valid peak. This in turn means that Jf(R) is hump-shaped for any α ∈ (0,1) and σ>1. On the
other hand if σ ∈ (0,1) we know from Lemma 11 that αv(σ) deﬁne all the combinations of α and σ
for which χ(α,σ)=1−R
∗
A = Υv. Let’s take the particular pair (αv,σv)s u c hχ(αv,σv)=1−R
∗
A = Υv.
Then using the assumption
(1−γ)
γ > −Υv, Lemma 11 and Fact 6 we know that for any α>α v we
have that χ(α,σv) >χ (αv,σv)=1−R∗
A = Υv which means that RJf > 1. But this result together with
the result for σ>1 imply that for any σ>0 and α>α v(σ) the function Jf (R) is hump-shaped with






3. Assume that 1 > −χ. If σ ∈ (0,σv∗] we know from Lemma 11 that αv(σ) deﬁne all the combinations
of α and σ for which χ(α,σ)=1−R∗
A = Υv. Let’s take the particular pair (αv,σv)s u c hχ(αv,σv)=
1−R∗
A = Υv. Then using the assumption
(1−γ)
γ > −Υv, Lemma 11 and Fact 6 we know that for any
α ≤ αv we have that χ(α,σv) ≤ χ(αv,σv)=1−R∗
A = Υv which means that RJf ≤ 1. That is we
d on o th a v eav a l i dp e a ks i n c ew ea s s u m e dt h a tR>1. I nt h i sc a s ew ea r eo n l yi n t e r e s t e di nt h e


















that Jf0 (R) < 0. Therefore Jf (R) is always strictly
decreasing.
A . 1 0 P r o o fo fL e m m a1 3
Proof.
1. Trivial.









= sign[χ] for any R>1. Using this and Fact 2 we conclude that





= sign[χ] for any R>1, and Fact 3 to conclude that for any σ>1, the function
Kf (R) is strictly increasing. The limits are trivial.
A . 1 1 P r o o fo fL e m m a1 4
Proof. The explicit expression for αw(σ) comes directly from its implicit deﬁnition χ(α,σ)=Υwand
some algebra. The proof follows the same steps as in the proof for Lemma 11 taking into account the





RL − 1 < 0
since RL−1
RL <R L − 1 < R∗−1
A . Second it is simple to show that since the rule is active R∗




RL − 1 < −R∗−1
A , or equivalently that −Υw < −Υv. With these results proceed following the
same steps as the ones in the proof for Lemma 11. The result σw∗ <σ v∗ < 1 follows from the deﬁnitions of
σw∗and σv∗ and from −Υw < −Υv.
A . 1 2 P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 5
Proof. The proof follows the same steps as the ones to prove Proposition 10. The only diﬀerence is that











. Moreover instead of using
Assumption 1 we use
(1−γ)(1−θN)
1−γ(1−θN) > Υk. Finally σk∗ >σ d∗ and αk∗ <α d∗ follow from the deﬁnitions of σk∗,
σd∗,α k∗,a n dαd∗, and applying the fact that Υk > Υd.
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